



## Interim evaluation 2010

# Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process, Nepal

Brief Report

**Published by:**

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Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH  
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This report was produced by independent external experts.  
It reflects only their opinion and assessment.

Zurich and Kathmandu May 2011

## Tabular overview

### The evaluation mission

Evaluation period	August 2010 – January, 2011 Field mission November 1-17, 2010
Evaluating institute / consulting firm	KEK-CDC Consultants
Evaluation team	Dieter Zürcher (KEK-CDC Consultants, international expert) Debendra Manandhar (J-CON/Nepal, national expert) Sabine Dinges (GTZ, only for data collection)

### The development measure

Title according to the offer	Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process (STPP)
Number	2007.2097.9
Overall term broken down by phases	Initial Phase: September 2007 – August 2009 In summer 2009 extended until December 2010, and in August 2010 extended until end of June 2013.
Total costs	Original: Euro 3 million, increased by an additional Euro 2 million in 2009 and further increased by Euro 2.5 million in August 2010. Thus, the total overall budget for the STPP is Euro 7.5 million.
Overall objective as per the offer, for on-going development measures also the objective for the current phase	The provision of support services for the interned Maoist Army combatants and the inhabitants of the surrounding wards is perceived by the interest groups affected as an example of the start of successful implementation of the peace process ( <i>Angebot</i> ).
Lead executing agency	Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR)
Implementing organisations (in the partner country)	STPP (GTZ) – the offer could not identify suitable local implementing agencies. Actually, next to STPP the Maoist Army Combatants (Division Commanders) and 3 training service providers (Don Bosco, Tradelinks and Training Center) are the most important implementing organisations.

Other participating development organisations	Training Institute for Technical Instruction (TITI), the Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training (CTEVT) and the National Skill Testing Board (NSTB) for quality assurance, and testing in the vocational training domain. The Nepal Business Initiative (NBI) will cooperate in absorbing the trained Maoist Army Combatants in future.
Target groups as per the offer	<p>1) The interned Maoist Army Combatants (19,645 verified persons) in 28 cantonments and camps (in 7 Divisions across Nepal). Around 20 % are females.</p> <p>2) People living in the surrounding villages of 25 cantonments and camps. In Division 3 no villages were included since the area is one of the wealthiest in Nepal. More than 50% of beneficiaries shall be females.</p> <p>3) Intermediaries are staff of the Ministries (Health, Education, Peace and Reconstruction, Public Works) as well as cadres of the Maoist Army.</p> <p>4) Indirectly the Nepalese citizens shall benefit through the maintenance of peace (by providing a context for sustainable development).</p>

## The rating

<p>Overall rating</p> <p><i>On a scale of 1 (very good, significantly better than expected) to 6 (the project/program is useless, or the situation has deteriorated on balance)</i></p>	The overall rating of the project is good (level 2).
Individual rating	Relevance and appropriateness: good (level 2); Effectiveness and coverage: good (level 2); Impact: satisfactory (level 3); Efficiency and coordination: good (level 2); Sustainability: good (level 2)

**Programme context:** Nepal went through a violent conflict between the national government and the Maoist party from 1996 to 2006. More than 13,000 people were killed during the violent conflict. The root causes of the conflict were the state's inability to respond to challenges such as extreme poverty, social, economic and regional disparities, and centralisation of state power. At that time, the power centre was the King and the Maoist party had the abolition of the monarchy as one of their core demands. In 2004, the Maoist party and seven political parties represented in the then parliament joined hands to fight against the monarchy. In 2005, they launched the "People's Movement" which turned out to be a massive people's uprising and the then King was forced to hand back power to the parliament.

In November 2006, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the government and the Maoists ending the 10 years old violent conflict. Amongst other issues such as drawing up a new constitution, the signatories agreed that all the Maoist Army Combatants would be interned in 28 cantonments and camps (located in seven divisions) and that all their arms would be stored in containers inside the cantonments, under the monitoring of United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). Furthermore, they agreed that parts of the Maoist Army Combatants are to be integrated into national security forces and the rest rehabilitated in the society before the election of the Constitutional Assembly (CA) planned for November 2007. But the CPA did not clearly elaborate the modality for the integration and rehabilitation. The CA election had to be postponed and was actually held in April 2008. The elaboration of the constitution could not be completed within the two years term (until May 2010) and had to be extended by 12 months. Progress appears to be slow due to political differences among the main parties.

Once the Maoist Army Combatants were interned in the cantonments a serious lack of supplies of basic services such as drinking water, sanitation facilities, accommodation and medical care emerged. The potential dissatisfaction could lead to a risk that the Maoist Army Combatants would leave the cantonments and resume the armed fight or join criminal gangs, thus negatively impacting on the national peace process.

On the request of the Nepalese Government to the German Government, GTZ appraised and planned a project (Support of Measures to Strengthen the Peace Process in Nepal, STPP) within a few months in 2007. The project was then agreed and designed for two years to improve the living conditions in the cantonments and the adjoining communities. Whereas in the beginning it was foreseen that the Maoist Army Combatants would be interned in the cantonments not more than 6-12 months, they have been there for over three years by now. Accordingly the STPP was extended twice. A clear political decision on the integration and

rehabilitation of the Maoist Army Combatants has been pending ever since and the whole Peace Process of Nepal is still very uncertain and unclear.

**Project concept:** the STPP is designed to support the on-going peace process in Nepal. The successful internment of the 19,645 verified Maoist Army Combatants is a critical issue in the implementation of the CPA. Therefore, the project is designed to improve the living conditions in the cantonments and camps by providing or up-grading basic services (drinking water, sanitation, health) and by offering a perspective to the future integration or rehabilitation through skills and vocational training. In order to improve relationships with surrounding villages (on the basis of the “do no harm” approach), the STPP supported people in 25 adjacent communities. By doing so, the project wanted to address the following core problem namely that the local authorities are unable to provide basic services (e.g. water) in a short period. The resulting dissatisfaction was seen as a potential source of negative impacts for the peace process.

**Technical implementation:** the project was designed as a response to the immediate needs in and around the cantonments. The Maoists would not allow anyone to work inside the cantonments and the trust towards GTZ was based on earlier projects in the core area of the insurgency. Thus, the project is following the modality of direct implementation of its activities. STPP has maintained good relationship and the trust from Maoists and this has become an entry point for project activities they were opposing initially (e.g. longer vocational training in civic trades). The project has been able to maintain a good working relationship and level of trust with the Maoist Army Combatants. Because of the uncertain and unclear context situation, the project has been taking a flexible and pragmatic approach as per the emerging needs and opportunities. Implementation of the activities follows state-of-the-art practices in terms of planning and monitoring as well as procurement of services.

**Evaluation mission:** on behalf of GTZ, Mr. Dieter Zürcher (from KEK-CDC, Zurich) and Mr. Debendra Manandhar (J-CON Nepal) conducted an independent interim evaluation of the STPP in Nepal. The team prepared an Inception Report prior to the mission. Ms Sabine Dinges from the GTZ evaluation department joined the field mission and participated in interviews and data collection. The field mission took place between November 1<sup>st</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup>, 2010. The evaluation held interviews with 25 key resource persons from various stake-holders (Nepalese partner institutions, donors and others). Field visits were carried out in all the Divisions (7 main cantonments and 10 satellite camps) and surrounding villages where Participatory Learning Centres (PLCs) are functional. Interviews with Commanders of the Maoist Army Combatants were held and 61 focus group interviews were conducted with Maoist Army Combatants, with PLC members and other community members from the surrounding villages of the cantonments and camps.

## **Assessment according to the five DAC criteria**

**Relevance and appropriateness:** the project is relevant and appropriate to address the needs of the peace process in Nepal and the specific requirements of the interned Maoist Army Combatants. The internment of the 19,645 Maoist Army Combatants is a highly politicised issue for the successful implementation of the CPA. The measures the project takes do respond timely to the acute basic needs of the Maoist Army Combatants in the cantonments and camps as well as the villagers in selected surrounding communities. Though the project is titled to support the peace process in Nepal it is not mandated to be directly engaged in activities related to conflict transformation at central level. Furthermore, working with the communities and empowering marginalised women is in line with the “do no harm” approach. The root cause – weak authorities to deliver services – has to be rethought since some important infrastructure to cantonments such as roads and electricity was provided by them (though often of mediocre quality). The rating for Relevance and Appropriateness is **good (level 2)**.

**Effectiveness and coverage:** the project implemented an amazing range of activities: from infrastructure (drinking water, sanitation), health (campaigns, training), skills and vocational trainings to the supply of basics (e.g. shoes, blankets, mosquito nets and others). A total of 15,000 Maoist Army Combatants and around 3-4,000 community members have benefitted directly from the support (e.g. access to drinking water has improved for an estimated 3,000 persons). These are impressive achievements. However, it is not possible to clearly state whether targets were over- or underachieved because target values and more detailed indicators were only developed at a later stage (2009) for the extension of the project. It has made contributions in keeping the Maoist Army Combatants inside the cantonments (as a result of improved living standards). The projects had a significant outreach to all of the cantonments and camps – with temporary exceptions in two cases – and included the gender aspect to promote female beneficiaries. Due to the spread of activities over 28 defined locations and the two extensions of the project it was not always possible to maintain coherent standards all over and at times support was ad hoc. The rating for effectiveness and coverage is **good (level 2)**.

**Overarching development results (impact):** The project has made contributions in keeping the Maoist Army Combatants inside the cantonments and this has contributed to keeping the peace process intact and peace is a pre-requisite for long-term development objectives. However, the Maoist Army Combatants stated that they would have stayed in the cantonments and camps even without additional support because it was a party doctrine. Furthermore, the regular salary for them is seen as an important incentive to remain in the camps.

There is some evidence that trainings have brought a change in the mind sets by exposing ex-combatants to new values (peace, democratisation, participation, etc.). The impact on Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is substantial in terms of better health (training, supplies), drinking water and sanitation facilities for the Maoist Army Combatants as well as for villagers. Poverty reduction (income) was not a direct aim of the project but such improvements are noticeable for a few hundred households in the surrounding villages. The empowerment of marginalised women by promoting literacy, income generation and collective actions has clearly increased opportunities for around 500 women and improved livelihoods of their families. The project also fostered social inclusiveness (especially through PLCs). The rating for overarching development results is **satisfactory (level 3)**.

**Efficiency and coordination:** working in 28 locations scattered from the East to the West of the country as well as in very diverse sectors has required substantial logistical efforts. Security-related costs were negligible because of the good relations between STPP and the Maoist Army Combatants and an improving overall situation. The per-unit costs are in the range of other similar projects. Activities are closely coordinated with the leadership of the Maoist Army Combatants at the central and at the division level as well as at the Steering Committee level. The latter, however, seems to have had little ownership for a long time but with improving trends now. There are good and frequent exchanges with other GTZ projects, especially in related fields such as the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, NPTF. There are also frequent exchanges with other donors but the exclusiveness of the GTZ relations with the Maoists is sceptically observed by various bi- as well as multi-lateral donors. An important point is the coordination with programme-based approaches (e.g. NPTF, line ministries) which are also active in the cantonments and camps. There is no evidence for duplication of activities but the bilateral approach of STPP activities requires constant coordination with those programmes. STPP can deliver faster due to its direct implementation modality. The rating for efficiency and coordination is **good (level 2)**.

**Sustainability:** the project is designed to quickly respond to the emerging basic needs in order to improve living conditions of the Maoist Army Combatants. Because of the short-term nature, the project is directly implemented and activities were not planned for longer terms. The sustainability of the installed infrastructure is a concern due to the fact that M&O systems are partially not functional and because the cantonments and camps have no budget provision for this. The skills and vocational training offer good scope for future application but only if a decision about the integration/rehabilitation is taken soon. The changes brought about by the empowerment of marginalised women will have long-term effects on socio-economic development of the communities. The rating for sustainability is **good (level 2)**.



**Overall rating:** the project is relevant in the present context of the peace process in Nepal and the support provided is highly appreciated by the beneficiaries. The project has to implement its activities in a very uncertain context and reacts pragmatically and flexibly to the challenges as well as opportunities. The project has maintained a good working relationship and high level of trust with the Maoist Army Combatants, which has helped the implementation of activities. The political decision on the integration and rehabilitation of the interned Maoist Army Combatants is yet to be taken and thus the final contribution of the project to the peace process might only be judgeable after that. The overall rating of the project is **good (level 2)**.

**Conclusions and recommendations:** The STPP project has contributed to improving the living conditions inside the 28 cantonments, which has contributed to keeping the Maoist Army Combatants inside the cantonments. It has indirectly – but in an unascertainable level - contributed to the implementation of the CPA. The various infrastructures, health support activities and the many different types of skills and vocational training have improved living conditions substantially. The training has helped the Maoist Army Combatants to prepare themselves for integration/rehabilitation through education and an orientation towards civic trades and civic attitudes.

Through small infrastructure activities and the empowerment of women in the surrounding communities, the project has contributed to improving lives of poor and disadvantaged groups of people in the communities. The project has in this regard also helped to improve the relations between the interned Maoist Army Combatants and the people living in the surrounding villages.


Lastly, through all these activities for improving living conditions in the cantonments and camps and improving the livelihoods of people in the surrounding villages, the project has indirectly encouraged the implementation of the CPA.

**The major recommendations are:**

- a) The STPP should continue to support mid and long-term training and should find ways and means to further qualify the interested Maoist Army Combatants in specific trades. The diversity of trades offered should be increased. For long-term trainings the matching of qualifications of candidates with the curricula is essential. The release of trainees for the trainings (outside the cantonments and camps) must be ensured.
- b) The support to infrastructure was phased out with the extension of STPP in 2010. This changed portfolio - compared to the beginning - should be adequately reflected in a revised results chain and monitoring system of the project.

- c) STPP needs to follow its emerging strategy for the PLC and further develop it in order to follow-up the existing PLC and the creation of new women's groups around the cantonments and camps. It should also be analysed whether this activity shall be outsourced to another GTZ project in the livelihood sector.
- d) The STPP has not systematically tackled the (water) resource conflicts in all cases. For the rest of the present phase, STPP shall verify the still existing resource conflicts (mainly water issues between cantonments/camps and villages) and include them into the operational plans.
- e) GTZ should lobby at MoPR/NPTF for providing regular M&O budgets for the cantonments and camps.
- f) The German Government should explore ways for a more pro-active engagement in the peace process by exploiting the opportunities offered through the experience gained by STPP/NPTF.

**Comparison of target and actual situation with respect to achievement of the objective, on the basis of the indicators laid out in the contract, including the status of BMZ markers (STPP 2007-2013)**



Notes: indicators on white background are from the offer but here with target values set at later stage. Red shaded are new indicators.

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