

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP



CAMEROON

**EVALUATION OF BANK GROUP ASSISTANCE
TO THE TRANSPORT 1996-2004**

**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT
(OPEV)**

4 March 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION.....	i-iv
1. CONTEXT	1
1.1. Objectives of the evaluation	1
1.2. Scope and methodology	1
1.3. Intervention context.....	1
1.4. History of relationship with the Bank Group	3
2. BANK ASSISTANCE TO THE SECTOR.....	4
2.1. General trend of policies and strategies.....	4
2.2. Description of lending activities.....	4
3. TREND OF SECTOR -BASED ASSISTANCE	9
3.1 Performance of non-lending assistance	9
3.2. Performance and outcomes of lending operations	12
3.3. Contribution to development.....	18
4. PERFORMANCE OF STAKEHOLDERS.....	
4.1. Borrower and Executing Agency	22
4.2. Bank.....	23
4.3. Other Donors	25
5. CONCLUSION, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	26
5.1. Conclusion.....	26
5.2. Lessons	27
5.3. Recommendations	28

<u>List of annexes</u>	<u>Nbr. of Pages</u>
Annex 1 Overall performance of Bank assistance	1
Annex 2 Performance of the project : AMBAM-EKING road	1
Annex 3 Performance of the project : MELONG-DSCHANG road	1
Annex 4 Performance of the project : CNIC naval repair base	1
Annex 5 Recommendations and monitoring matrix	1
Annex 6 Trend of GDP at current prices (2000/2004) in CFAF billion	1
Annex 7 Matrix of projects and outcomes	4
Annex 8 Map of project road network: MELONG-DSCHANG road project	1
Annex 9 AMBAM-EKING road Project	1
Annex 10 Site map of the CNIC project	1
Annex 11 Transport Projects between 1972 and 2004 in CAMEROON	1
Annex 12 Schedule of transport sector operations	1
Annex 13 Bibliography (list of documents used) *	1
Annex 14 List of persons consulted in CAMEROON * :	1
Annex 15 Comparative socio-economic indicators	1

This report is prepared by Messrs. P.A ROCHON, Principal Evaluation Officer and Idir KENDEL, Consultant, following a mission to Cameroon from 12 to 30 March 2007. All questions should be referred to Mr. H. RAZAFINDRAMANANA, ext. 2294 or Mr. C. KIRK, Director OPEV, ext. 2041.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	:	African Development Bank
ADF	:	African Development Fund
AER	:	Rural Electrification Agency
AES-SONEL	:	Allied Energy Services - National Electricity Corporation
AFD	:	French development agency
BEAC	:	Bank des Etats de l'Afrique centrale (Bank of Central African States)
CAA	:	Autonomous Sinking Fund
CEMAC	:	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CFA	:	Communauté Financière Africaine
CIG	:	Common initiative group
CTS	:	Technical monitoring committee for economic programmes
CUD	:	Douala City Council
CUY	:	Yaoundé City Council
ECAM	:	Cameroonian households survey
EDF	:	European Development Fund
ERC	:	En route charges
EU	:	European Union
FEICOM	:	Special Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance
GDP	:	Gross Domestic Product
HIPC	:	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIPC-I	:	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
IDA	:	International Development Association
IMF	:	International Monetary Fund
INS	:	National Statistics Institute
KFW	:	Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (German cooperation Agency)
MDC	:	Multi-donor committee (monitoring of the PRSP)
MDG	:	Millennium Development goal
MINEFI	:	Ministry of the Economy and Finance
MINEPAT	:	Ministry of economic affairs and regional development
MINPLAPDAT	:	Ministry of planning, development programming and regional development
MINT	:	Ministry of Transport
MINTP	:	Ministère des Travaux Publics
NGO	:	Non-governmental Organizations
ODA	:	Official Development Assistance
PCR	:	Project Completion Report
PIB	:	Public investment budget
PRR	:	Portfolio review report
PRSP	:	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RF	:	Road Fund
RP	:	Road Programme
SNEC	:	Société nationale des eaux du Cameroon (National water corporation)
SONEL	:	Société nationale d'électricité (National electricity corporation)
TAF	:	Technical Assistance Fund (instrument of the Bank)
TSP	:	Transport Sectoral Project
TSPP	:	Special Taxes on petroleum products
UA	:	Unit of account of the ADB Group
UNDP	:	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	:	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
VOC	:	Vehicle Operating cost
WB	:	World Bank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION

Objectives:

1. The objective of the study is to evaluate Bank assistance to Cameroon in the transport sector, as well as its impact on the country's development, within the framework of the Bank's strategies during the period 1996-2004. The goal is to see whether these strategies were relevant, if the interventions achieved their goals, if the allocated resources were used judiciously and if the instruments used were the most appropriate. The purpose of this evaluation is thus to measure the performance of the Bank, while highlighting the factors on which it was able to adopt policy actions (strategy, financial instruments, coordination, supervision, implementation of projects). Lessons will be drawn and recommendations will be made for the Bank so that it can apply them once the CSP 2005-2009 is revised.

Observations:

2. Cameroon has the 2nd largest asphalted road network and the 2nd largest trunk road network among ECCAS countries, with a paved roads rate of 22 % (ECCAS average 15 %). However, of the country's 10 provinces, 3 handle 75 % of daily medium-heavy traffic, but are equipped with only 37 % of the paved network. Transport expenditure constituted 4.7% of the budget of the populations, which is almost as much as their health expenditure (5.7%). According to official surveys, 26 to 34 % of transport costs are due to racketeering by the security service personnel posted on the roads.

3. At end - 2004, the cumulative commitments of the Bank Group in Cameroon's transport sector since 1972, represented 37 % of its total cumulative commitments over a 33-year period, a rate higher than the average of its commitments in Africa in this sector (17 %). The CSP 1996-1998 did not envisage any Transport sector operation and it is in the CSP 1999-2001 that this sector reappears and the CSP 2002-2004 also maintains the Transport sector in the Bank strategy, following extensive consultations with the Cameroonian civil society.

4. The 3 projects financed fell within the framework of Cameroon's development Programmes and of the Bank's policy and strategies. More than 35 studies featuring in Cameroon's transport sectoral Program (TSP), were used as a basis for the evaluation of these projects. The relevance and quality at entry of Bank assistance were thus very satisfactory, contrary to their effectiveness and their efficiency, since all these projects incurred delays of more than 2.5 years, entailing an upward revision of their local costs. Bank assistance impacted the development of the two executing agencies, by extending their experience to the implementation of infrastructure projects with a strong social dimension, which the Bank was the first to initiate in Cameroon. Even if the institutional impacts resulting from collective actions are difficult to quantify, the Bank reinforced the actions of the Multi- Donor Committee (MDC) and the opening of the regional Representation of the Bank in Cameroon should further reinforce this assistance.

5. Thanks to the increase in the budgets of the Road Fund and the great experience of CNIC in large shipyards, the sustainability of these operations remains highly probable. As regards the social aspects and gender equality, the Bank's performance is satisfactory. The impact on private sector development is unsatisfactory. One of the two roads has

considerably reinforced economic integration (Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea) and constitutes a vector of revitalization of their trade. The repair of tankers and oil platforms in the Gulf of Guinea will also strengthen co-operation in the area. As regards financial engineering, it was for the enclave project that the Bank responded to the co-financing proposal, via the ADB window. The 2 financial instruments used (ADF, ADB) were thus well-adapted and enabled the Bank to increase its commitments in Cameroon, even if it had had to seek the IMF's "no objection".

6. With several stakeholders involved in the management of the road heritage, decision-making is not always very coherent. Hence, in 2005 the Government set up the National Roads Board, as an authority to coordinate road infrastructure programs. Besides the recurrent problems concerning project management and mobilization of local counterpart funds, the Project Owner cut off 174 km of farm-to-market roads from the 2 road projects financed, whereas this vision had been well received during the preparation of the CSP. The Borrower's performance is thus unsatisfactory and it even adversely affects the Bank's performance. Despite this missing aspect, the performance of Bank assistance remains satisfactory.

Conclusions

7. Although the Bank's assistance cannot be comparable to that of donors such as the EU and AFD, it provided strong support to Cameroon's transport sector, thanks notably to the financial weight of the CNIC project (UA M. 30 of a total of UA M 54 for the 3 projects, on account of the moderate dimensions of the 2 roads financed). The assistance of the Bank enabled the introduction of a major innovation and the implementation of infrastructure projects with a social dimension seems promising and gives food for thought, as it is capable of helping the Bank to centre its strategies on infrastructure that will go with social facilities. The 3 projects evaluated showed that in spite of the delays, it is quite possible to design and build a road or a shipyard complex, along with schools, health centres, cultural centres and small agricultural projects (even water, sanitation and rural electrification). This vision can indeed enable the Bank to strengthen its image as a donor focusing on integrated and broad social impact infrastructure, which can be the best means of attaining the MDGs, with minimal waste of financial resources.

8. As regards private sector development repeatedly raised in CSPs, Cameroon's legal and fiscal provisions remain unclear. However, the Bank should not lose sight of the possibility of making the CNIC enclave project a springboard of industrial and technological development for the benefit of the private sector. The establishment of this project on the same site as an oil refinery permits the creation of a shipbuilding and oil industry-oriented technology pole, capable of generating a fabric of SMEs in the domain of ship maintenance subcontracting. Such a strategy would constitute an indirect means of strengthening the competitiveness and sustainability of the CNIC project.

9. The Bank has thus reached a turning point, where it needs to envisage infrastructure that foster economic growth and have components with a social dimension. This approach could give the Bank a major advantage over other donors. The minor road projects financed by the Bank have an impact that is difficult to quantify and have a high banking management cost, while causing a gradual decline in the efficiency of its human resources.

Lessons:

- (i) the Bank showed proof of inadequate appraisal of the role of related works and the comparative advantage they provide its assistance quality; it did not seek to ensure their effective implementation, leaving sole responsibility for them to the Borrower, which had difficulties mobilizing the resources from the PIB and HIPC, whereas these integrated works were eagerly awaited by the populations. Given that the CSP does not underscore this advantage, this innovation is not perceived as a strategic choice and irreversible option.
- (ii) Transport has structuring effects, but the Bank did not make proper use of the TAF instrument and take advantage of the works of the other donors, to prepare potential projects, with the private sector, whereas the successive CSPs repeatedly proposed the identification of enclave projects and operations with the private sector. The Bank-financed operations have demonstrated that it is possible to provide infrastructure in a coherent manner, at the same time as schools, health centres, cultural centres and minor viable agricultural projects. This innovative vision could thus enable the Bank to be perceived as a preferential donor, when it comes to infrastructures with a strong social impact, enabling the attainment of the MDGs, with optimized investment, better performance of the assistance and less waste of monitoring efforts.
- (iii) Cameroon is targeting a high overall road density, whereas 3/4 of its road traffic is concentrated on only 3 regions (out of 10) which hardly account for 1/3 of the national paved network. The Borrower is thus likely to err in making and weighting its investment options, thus ending up with works which are likely to be under-used. Such a strategy would not only affect Borrower performance, but would negatively impact the Bank's performance.

Recommendations

10. The Bank should shun minor projects and focus its strategy towards the financing of integrated and integrative infrastructure projects, which give its assistance a comparative advantage over other donors. Furthermore, in order not to jeopardize the value added obtained through this advantage to the projects which it finances, the Bank should include their costs in the share it finances and should attach as much importance to them as to the main work, in order to spare them the risks of unavailability of the local counterpart funds.

11. The Bank should use the TAF to study the need to create an industrial and technological pole on the CNIC site. This technological centre would be shipbuilding and oil industry-oriented and could generate a fabric of SME specializing in subcontracting. UNIDO having already financed a study on enterprise nurseries in Cameroon, this approach by the Bank would also constitute an indirect means of mitigating the risk of the CNIC project and enhancing the competitiveness and sustainability of this major enclave project.

12. The Bank should undertake relevance studies which would enable it to select the country's absolute priorities, and choose only operations with the strongest inter-sector

complementarities. The CSP should thus be very selective, in terms of targeting sectors and branches, but also projects, while taking into account their integrative capacity, their complementarities and their capacity to impact the matrix of economic activities and growth. As regards land transport, the country should rather give priority to the 3 areas where road traffic is concentrated, over any egalitarian considerations.

1. CONTEXT

1.1. Objectives of the evaluation

The purpose of the study is to evaluate Bank Group assistance to Cameroon's transport sector, as well as its impact on the country's development, for the period running from 01/01/1996 to 31/12/2004. The goal is to see whether the Bank interventions achieved their goals, if the allocated resources were used judiciously and if the financial instruments used were the most appropriate. The Bank's contribution to this sector constitutes a component of assistance to Cameroon, to which other multilateral and bilateral donors also contribute. This evaluation measures Bank performance by highlighting the elements on which it has the capacity to act, based on the relevance of its strategies, the definition and supervision of the projects financed, the compatibility of non-lending instruments which it used in combination with loan-financed projects, the outcomes of the country's development projects and lastly, the level of coordination that it maintained with its other donors.

1.2 Scope and methodology

1.2.1 In accordance with Bank directives, this evaluation was conducted on the strategies of assistance to the Transport sector (3 CSP over the period) and on the outcomes and impacts of the financed operations. The evaluation criteria used are: (i) relevance; (ii) quality at entry; (iii) effectiveness; (iv) efficiency; (v) impact of this sectoral assistance on the institutional organization; (vi) sustainability; (vii) cross-cutting impacts; (viii) performance of the borrower; (ix) contribution of the other donors; and (x) exogenous factors having an impact on the performance of the assistance.

1.2.2 This report was written following 2 weeks of preliminary work in Tunis, followed by a 3-week mission to Cameroon (2-24 March 2007) for the purpose of : (i) collecting relevant data and information relating to the results and the impacts of the strategies and the programmes of sectoral assistance of the Bank; (ii) discussing with the Cameroonian Authorities and Officials of the executing agency, the relevance, performance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact on the socio-economic and institutional development, as well as sustainability of the financed projects; (iii) validating and supplementing the initial reports made during the preparation of the mission at the headquarters of the Bank; and finally (iv) drawing the conclusions and lessons from this evaluation, and then making the appropriate recommendations, so that on the one hand, the Bank can better formulate its future strategies of sectoral assistance to Cameroon and that on the other hand, the country can best benefit from Bank assistance.

1.3 Context of intervention

1.3.1 Socio-economic context

1.3.1.1 In 1996, Cameroon's share in the outstanding loans of the ADB was 3 % and the Government had audited its overall arrears owed the Bank in September 1996. Cameroon's economic activity profile remained fragile and vulnerable to the risks of the international economic situation, as it was marked by: (i) a very outward-oriented production; (ii) a consumption model dominated by imported products; (iii) an uncompetitive industry; (iv) the production of goods with low value added; (v) exports based on resource exploitation; and (iv) a tax system which discourages the creation of SMEs.

1.3.1.2 Institutional red-tape slows down the rate of absorption of external assistance, even if at the level of the Bank, certain conditionalities are themselves generating the deceleration of this rate of consumption of the financing. Another growing general trend is the slowness in budgeting and mobilizing the counterpart funds. In addition, the compliance procedures for disbursement requests are slow as projects are not always spared by corrupt practices. It should be recalled that in 1988, the Ministry of Public Works (MINTP) and Ministry of Transport (MINT), were merged to form Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MINTPT), in order to “facilitate uniformity in transport sector decisions”. However, these two Ministries were again separated in 1998, on the recommendation of the World Bank, in the wake of the Transport Sectoral Program (TSP).

1.3.2 Sector context

1.3.2.1 Cameroon is both a port and a transit route serving certain landlocked countries such as Chad and the Central African Republic. At the domestic level, a survey of price and poverty trends showed that apart from the purchasing prices of food products, the highest share of their marketing costs is that of transport. Among the poor, the 2001 households survey (ECAM) had also shown that their transport expenses (4.7% of their budgets), were almost equivalent to their health expenses (5.7%). According to one survey, 26 to 34 % of transport costs are due to racketeering at road checkpoints, whereas fuel accounts for 39 to 57 % of transport costs and vehicle maintenance 6 to 7 %. According to ECCAS (cf Annex), Cameroon has the second highest paved road network and the second highest trunk road network among ECCAS countries, with a paved roads rate of 22 % (ECCAS average = 15 %). However, in terms of road density, Cameroon has 9 km/1000 km² and 0.280 km/1000 inhabitants, against (16; 0.384) for Côte d'Ivoire and (25; 0.354) for Ghana. It should be noted that in terms of vehicle population, private vehicles represented 72 % in 2005 and commercial and industrial vehicles represent 63 % of daily traffic (cf. Annex). Three (3) Provinces alone (Centre, Littoral and West) of the 10 in Cameroon account for 75 % of daily traffic. The road toll is applied across the board, but could be revised on the basis of these data, as well as that of the degrader-pays principle, which is yet to be introduced.

1.3.2.2 Since 1994, Cameroon has been eligible only to concessional resources. Following its sectoral Policy Letter approved in 1995, which included a program of reforms and an investment plan, the Government of Cameroon then set up a Transport Sectoral Program which was approved in 1996, after five years of sustained work by donors, including the Bank. Following this TSP, the European Union financed a road maintenance program to assist the putting in place of the Road Fund (RF), enhance the capacities of the Ministry of public works (MINTP) in works supervision, consolidate the private sector in this sector and support the decentralization of rural roads maintenance.

1.3.2.3 The success of the TSP depended primarily on close coordination between the donors and the government services involved in the development of the sector. In the wake of this TSP, Cameroon had put in place road heritage protection framework, created road maintenance Fund (RF) and adopted instruments aimed at environmental protection during road works. It is noteworthy that the RF is an arm of the Treasury, charged with settling the bills of private road maintenance companies. It is thus only an instrument of payment and not an independent body, let alone a road management agency. However, despite this form of organization which seems to be functioning well, the financial efforts remain weak and the road network is still in a bad state, even with the increase and differentiated application (lower rise in diesel price to avoid worsening the inflation of goods transport costs) of road user charges in 2006.

1.3.2.4 Since its inception, the RF has accelerated the payments of maintenance companies (less than 5 days, against 40 to 60 days formerly). It is in the process of becoming a 2nd generation Road Fund, with a second Window (that of investment and rehabilitation), following the Maintenance window. In spite of its limited resources, this RF will have helped slow down the rate of infrastructure deterioration and strengthen road maintenance. The Government has thus been able to: (i) focus road maintenance on the priority network; (ii) secure the funds earmarked for such maintenance; (iii) liberalize urban transport; and (iv) involve communities in road maintenance and develop the concept of labour – intensive works.

1.4 History of the relationship with the Bank Group

1.4.1 As from 1991, the World Bank played a lead role as regards coordination of assistance, within the framework of the SAPs. In 1995, when Cameroon was paced under sanction and became eligible only to concessional resources, the ADB window then became ill-suited to the new economic conditions of the country. The Bank which had not signed any commitment in the Transport sector since 1991, only resumed them as from 2001 (incidentally the project signed in 1991 was stopped subsequently). However, given the insufficiency of ADF resources, the Bank sought in vain to co-finance its projects with the World Bank and the European Union. It was only able to do so under an enclave project, in which none of these two multilateral donors were involved.

1.4.2 In 1996, after 24 years of co-operation with Cameroon (1972-1996), the breakdown of the Bank portfolio (cf Annex) shows that the Transport represents 44.47 % of commitments and that it benefited from 10 projects out of the 28 which were financed over a period of 25 years. From 1996, it was no longer appropriate to continue financing the remaining activities of the Road Programme project with resources of the ADB window, whereas this Bank-financed project had supported the country, as regards the asphaltting of roads, construction of bridges and supply of equipment to the MINTP. The Government and the Bank then agreed to cancel this RP, including the development of the Melong-Dschang road where work had not yet started. This road was subsequently covered by a project financed by ADF resources. The strategic choices of the 3 CSP of the 1996-2005 decade made it possible to restore the balance of this portfolio, hence between 1972 and 2005, the cumulative commitments of the transport sector dropped to 37.04 % of the value of the cumulative commitments over 33 years, that is, a fall of 8 points (by contrast and for purposes of comparison, the agriculture and social on sectors respectively gained 5 and 5.5 points in relative value ranking).

1.4.3 It should be noted that this relative weight of the transport sector is higher than the average of commitments of the Bank in this sector in Africa (less than 17 % at end -2004).

ADB GROUP COMMITMENTS BY SECTOR FROM 1972-2005

	1972-2005			Of which 1996-2005		
	Nbr	UA M	%	Nbr	UA M	%
Transport	16	274.79	37.04	3	54.08	20.24
Water, Sanitation, Energy	6	40.22	5.42	4	27.58	10.32
Agriculture	21	162.71	21.93	9	62.76	23.49
Social	11	71.26	9.61	9	57.93	21.68
Other (industry, mines)	3	15.64	2.11	0	0	0.00
Multisector (non-MSF)	6	149.06	20.09	3	36.70	13.73
Financing mechanisms (MSF)	3	28.16	3.80	3	28.16	10.54
Total	66	741.84	100.00	31	267.21	100.00

Source : OPEV

2. BANK ASSISTANCE TO THE SECTOR

2.1 General trend of policies and strategies

a) Bank Strategies

2.1.1 It was in 1992 that Bank officialized its transport sectoral policy, which is centred on : (i) improving the standards of transport facilities and infrastructure; (ii) strengthening of transport institutions and network exploitation; (iii) encouraging the use of local resources to finance road maintenance, rehabilitation of degraded roads and construction of new roads; (iv) using flexible instruments such as road funds; (v) introducing taxes to enable recovery of operating and capital costs; and lastly (v) liberalizing the transport sector and encouraging private sector investment.

2.1.2 This sectoral Policy of the Bank also underscores: (i) the importance of rural roads; (ii) importance of measures enabling the sectoral Institutions to perform and to improve the efficiency of their human resources; (iii) effectiveness of transport planning and coordination, for the optimal allocation of resources to the various transport modes; and lastly (iv) the need to promote road safety.

2.1.3 However, for 1996-1998, the strategy of Bank was aimed at restoring macroeconomic balances, increasing agricultural production and developing Cameroon's human resources. The financial allocation for this period was broken down as follows: 40% for agriculture and 60% for the social aspect. Thus, the CSP did not envisage any operation in the Transport sector. It is over the period 1999-2001 that the transport sector features, however without the CSP explaining why Bank was to finance operations in this sector, rather than in the Energy or Industry sector. According to this CSP 1999-2001, the Bank could also finance enclave projects, without equally specifying in which branches or subsectors such projects would be most appropriate for the Bank. In the transport sector, priority routes had already been defined under a Transport Program supported by the EU and the AFD. It is within this framework that the Bank financed the 2 road projects, one (Ambam-Eking road) of which was implemented complementarily with the projects financed by the EU and the AFD. The CSP 2002-2004 maintains the Transport sector in the Bank's strategy, following broad consultations with Cameroonian civil society, during which no industrial project was put forward. This strategy was confirmed by the update document of this CSP.

2.1.4 Thus, at the level of the Bank, the road transport sub-sector underwent two periods of sectoral policy. The pre-1996 period when donors invested massively in roads (the World Bank alone invested over USD 500 M. and the ADB Group approximately UA M 220). These interventions were all part of the vision of increasing Cameroon's road network, without any existing sectoral strategy document as yet. The year 1996 was on the other hand characterized by the implementation of the TSP (Transport Sectoral Program), prepared within the framework of the Structural Adjustment (after 5 years of consultation between the Government and donors) and which served as a strategic framework over a 7- year period for projects financed by IDA, AFD, EU, ADF and IsDB. This TSP was completed in 2003. Nevertheless, the update document of the CSP 2002-2004 and the 2004 **RRP** mentioned that the two ongoing road projects were insufficient and thus encouraged the Bank to reinforce its intervention in the roads subsector, whereas Cameroon no longer had a TSP. The same applies to the CSP 2005-2009, which also encourages the Bank to strengthen its assistance in this sector, without even mentioning that since 2003, Cameroon no longer has a sectoral Program.

b) Borrower's Strategy

2.1.5 In Cameroon, roads play a major role in economic development, which relies on the agricultural sector, but most rural areas are cut off from urban zones, which should normally serve as the natural recipients of their production. However, the majority of the roads are in an advanced state of degradation owing to the lack of maintenance. This reduces the contribution of agriculture to the national income, affects transport costs and increases vehicle operating costs (VOC). These are among the reasons why the transport sectoral policy adopted in 1994 by Cameroon was centred on: (i) protecting the road heritage; (ii) opening up of the regions; (iii) reducing transport costs; and (iv) encouraging private sector investment in road transport.

2.1.6 This policy is also aimed at the withdrawal of the State from execution of works and its concentration on the tasks of planning, programming, budgeting and control of implementation. It is further aimed at setting up a road fund to ensure regular and sustainable financing of road maintenance work. To improve the state of its national road network, the Cameroon Government had conceived, with the assistance of donors (including the WB, EU, AFD and ADB Group) a sectoral project which defines a priority network on which it would desire their interventions to be concentrated.

2.1.7 In 1996, the Government prepared a Strategy Statement and prepared a Transport Sectoral Program (TSP), with a poverty reduction vision. A Road Fund was created to perpetuate the financing of maintenance operations thanks to this externalized mechanism, which however remains under the supervision of the Treasury. This Statement was followed by the separation of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport into 2 Ministries and then, a new organization chart for the Public Ministry of Public Works was introduced, so that its set-up would better meet performance objectives. However, many institutional inconsistencies quickly surfaced, with the prevalence of the MINTP over the MINT. They were so severe that they ended up slowing down the development of the sector. It is in a bid to eliminate these inconsistencies that a Presidential order created the National Roads Board in early 2005. Its basic mission consists in assisting the Government throughout the development, implementation, control and monitoring of the execution of the national road Policy. Within the framework of *the Memorandum of Understanding on the reform and financing of the road sub-sector in Cameroon* (2006), which the Government prepared in consultation with donors,

including the Bank, in order to preserve the gains of the TSP which ended in 2003, pending TSP II, this NRB has already adopted: (i) a new classification of roads; (ii) a new stratification of the network; and (iii) a program for 2006-2025.

2.1.8 Regarding maritime transport, its reorganization led to the creation of the National Ports Authority, which is responsible for defining the management policy of Cameroonian ports. Douala port traffic rose from 3.59 million tons in 1993 to 5.26 million tons in 1999 (more than 90% of the traffic). This port is under-used on account of the shallowness of its access channel and its constant silting. It had thus become necessary to transfer the CNIC shipyard and oil platforms maintenance base out of Douala. More than 20 % of the 2200 - metre wharfs are assigned to the CNIC shipyard, for the dry dock and the reception of oil platforms. However, Cameroon was unable to mobilize the funds required to finance such a naval repair base project.

c) Relevance

2.1.9 The Bank-financed transport projects fell within the framework of Cameroon's development Programmes (the TSP was supported by the Bank), as well as the strategies and sectoral policy of the Bank. The 2 road projects financed by the Bank between 1996 and 2004 belonged to the network identified as priority and featuring in the RDP, whereas the related works were squarely in line with the country's school and health maps, just as they were with the social policy of the Bank. The CNIC Project for its part is relevant in the maritime sector reform which could no longer be undertaken given the saturation of the Douala port, which limits Cameroon's export activity. The other reason is Cameroon's need to have a deep water port to accommodate more oil platforms and large oil tankers for repair. This project also contributes to sub-regional co-operation, as its scale enables it to provide services to all the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. The purpose of this highly technical naval repair base with high structuring capacity is to enable an increase in Cameroon's foreign exchange receipts. This project falls within the framework of Bank policy which encourages the development of maritime infrastructure capable of boosting the export earnings of African countries and regional trade. The financial instrument used by the Bank (ADB window) was the only one through which infrastructure of that scale, which could not be covered by an ADF concessional loan, could be supported. This project was cofinanced because the interest shown by the Bank encouraged other donors to contribute to it. Besides, the Bank was made project leader. However, when this loan was granted, Cameroon could not have access to the ADB window, even if this enclave project does not absolutely contradict the general criteria of access to financing by the window. This project is indeed: (i) productive and profitable; (ii) co-financed; and (iii) has regional integration capacity.

2.1.10 It should be noted that even if none of the 3 CSP mentions this CNIC project, the 1996-1998 CSP had already announced that the Government was to implement the restructuring of Douala port, in order to reduce maritime transport costs. The 1999-2001 CSP for its part indicated that the Bank could finance enclave projects, considering the existing possibilities in this domain. The matrix of this CSP even included the reduction of transit costs and time spent at Douala port. It also mentions that the search for cofinancing was to be given priority so as to create synergy and strengthen the complementarity between the various donor interventions and optimize its impact on the country's development. The 2002-2004 CSP also mentions the possibilities of financing enclave projects and multinational projects which should be examined by the Bank. It also recalls that the policy of seeking for cofinancing will be reinforced. The update of this CSP also recalled that the Bank should

examine the possibilities of financing enclave projects and private sector operations. The 3 projects financed were thus consistent not only with the Bank's sectoral policies but also with its successive strategies between 1996 and 2004, just as they were in line with Cameroon's sectoral policy, translated by the TSP (itself supported by Bank) and the Roads Development Program (RDP). For all these reasons, ***Bank assistance was very relevant.***

d) Quality at entry

2.1.11 It should be recalled that the TSP was financed by a consortium of donors of which the World Bank, European Union, French development agency and the African Development Bank. Within the framework of the implementation of this TSP, the various Bank missions recommended that the MINTP play the role of sole executing agency of the program and even obtained that it set up an implementation Unit specifically for Bank-financed projects. The resultant RDP was developed using the programming tool HDM III (*Highway Design and Maintenance Model*, provided by the World Bank. The Ambam-Eking road project had been the subject of feasibility studies, preliminary design and detail design, all financed by the AFD. The initial appraisal took into account the environmental impact assessment, also financed by the AFD, as well as the measures to mitigate the negative effects recommended by this EIA. The Melong-Dschang road (initially registered under the Roads Program project adopted in 2000) had for its part, been the subject of detail design, just like its 4 bridges (studies financed by the EU in 1993 and updated by the Government in 2000), at the same time as a socio-economic study which served as a basis for the re-appraisal of the project by the Bank. The Bank for its part carried out the environmental impact assessments, in conjunction with the environment unit of the MINTP. As regards the CNIC project, the feasibility study was conducted between 1999 and 2001, even prior to the approval of the loan by Bank. CNIC even commissioned a market research and a Master-Plan. Environmental impact assessments and complementary research on the social environment and marine life were subsequently conducted by renowned consulting firms. Hydraulic studies of the 2 wharfs, bathymetric studies and a study of simulation of the swells were also conducted to guarantee the physical sustainability of the work. An architectural study was even carried out to prevent the work disfiguring this seaside resort. These 3 Bank-financed operations were in conformity with the choices and recommendations of CSP 1999-2001 of Cameroon. In addition to the 2 projects included in the TSP supported by Bank and the RDP, there are also more than 35 studies which also served as a technical and economic baseline for the preparation and appraisal of the 3 Bank-financed projects in the sector. The ***quality at entry of Bank assistance was thus very satisfactory.***

2.2 Description of the lending activities

2.2.1 Between 1991 and 2001, that is a full decade, the Bank had no commitments in the Transport sector (cf Annex), before resuming with the Ambam-Eking road project in December 2000. However, it should be noted that this sector was not the only one where Bank assistance was stopped, since the energy sector also received no financing over a 13-year period (1985 to 1998) and witnessed a recovery only with the **PDER** study. The 3 operations which were financed between 1996 and end- 2004 are:

BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN CAMEROON (1996-2004)

1. MAINTENANCE INFRASTRUCTURE CONST. PROJECT.

Window	Approval	Signature	Approved	Disbursed
ADB	12-Dec-02	2-Jun-03	30,780,704.43	5,804,632.74

2. PROVINCIAL ROADS IMPROVEMENT PROJECT:

Window	Approval	Signature	Approved	Disbursed
ADF	29-Mar-01	29-May-01	15,000,000.00	8,207,675.86

3. AMBAM-EKING ROAD PROJECT:

Window	Approval	Signature	Approved	Disbursed
ADF	14-Dec-00	2-Feb-01	8,900,000.00	7,946,447.83

Source: ADB

a) AMBAM-EKING ROAD PROJECT

2.2.2 The project was aimed at contributing to the improvement of the living conditions of the populations in the South and Centre Provinces and to regional integration. Following the request from the Government in February 1999, the Bank carried out its appraisal in July 2000. The objectives achieved at end- 2004 were limited to section I (asphalted road) and to the purchase of computer and transport equipment. During this appraisal, work on the 87 km of tracks, designed to link up farming areas was still uncompleted.

b) PROVINCIAL ROADS IMPROVEMENT PROJECT:

2.2.3 The project was aimed at sustainably improving the service level of the priority network which contributes to opening up the country internally and externally, and at linking up the areas with high agricultural potentialities. Furthermore, it was expected to contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of the local populations through the provision of related facilities. It should be recalled that development of this road had already been envisaged within the framework of the road program approved in 1991 and had been financed by the ADB window. However, this RP could not come into force on schedule. From 1994, Cameroon was eligible only for the concessional resources of the Bank and the RP projects not yet implemented had then been directed to the ADF for possible financing. Taking into account the importance of this road and its capacity to contribute to poverty reduction among the populations of the area, Cameroon had approached the Bank and had obtained an approval of a loan to finance this project with concessional funds. Once again, the long delay which followed made it eligible for cancellation. The 1st disbursement could take place only on 8 February 2004 that is, 25 months following loan effectiveness. At end- 2004, the physical rate of implementation of this project had reached 30% and exceeded 97 % in 2007.

c) CNIC ENCLAVE PROJECT

2.2.4 This enclave project was aimed at increasing the share of the industrial sector in Cameroon's GDP and enabling CNIC to capture a share of the oil platforms repair market in the Gulf of Guinea. The project comprises 4 components: (i) construction of off-shore and on-shore structures; (ii) procurement of on-shore and floating equipment; (iii) training and construction of a staff training centre; and (iv) management of the project.

THE TOTAL COST (BEFORE TAXES) OF THIS WORK WAS COFINANCED BY :

Contributor	Contribution	In CFAF Bln.	Percentage
ADB	USD M. 45.40	31.78	37.18 %
IsDB	USD M. 24.22.	16.95	18.83 %
Dutch Fund	EUR M. 24.51	16.08	16.87 %
CNIC (Project Owner)	USD M.10.42 EUR M. 05.41	10.84	12.68 %.
ABEDA	USD M 12.00	08.40	09.84 %
BDEAC	EUR M. 2.262	01.42	01.66 %
Total	-	85.47	100%

Source : CNIC

2.2.5 To obtain the first disbursement from the Bank, CNIC needed to satisfy 12 conditions, but the 11th condition posed a problem, by requiring CNIC to provide evidence that all the loans of the other donors were effective. Owing to the delay thus incurred, the cost had to be revised upward (about 30 %), thus compelling CNIC to approach the ADB for supplementary financing. This increase was due mainly to: (i) depreciation of the dollar against the CFA franc; (ii) rise in unit prices owing to the shift in the calendar; (iii) increase in petroleum product prices; and (iv) the scale of the geological hazards which impacted the cost of dredging and foundation works.

3. EVOLUTION OF SECTORAL ASSISTANCE

3.1 Performance of non-lending assistance

3.1.1. Policy dialogue:

3.1.1.1 In Cameroon, donor assistance was coordinated at the national level by a development aid Coordinating committee, set up by a decree of September 1995 and placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. It was designed to serve as a framework of dialogue with multilateral and bilateral donors for a harmonious and optimal use of aid. A decree of 1998 supplements the previous decree by creating a Coordinator (assisted by a technical unit), appointed by the Prime Minister who monitors the activities of the Committee. In practice however, the Committee seems superfluous, with the poorly resourced Department of Economic and Technical Co-operation (formerly under MINPAT before being moved to MINEFI), which also follows up co-operation with donors.

3.1.1.2 The CSP 1999-2001 had adopted a participatory approach with civil society and was intended to be a consensual CSP, involving all society components and incorporating their viewpoints. After examining this DSP within the Bank, a dialogue mission was deployed to validate its contents with stakeholders in order to obtain a final consensus on the strategy selected. Such was also the case for the CSP 2002-2004, the third CSP of the period under review. Nevertheless, according to the Chairman of the Technical Monitoring Committee, the final choices made by the Bank did not always reflect the said consensus.

3.1.1.3 The Bank Group has learnt many lessons from its experience in Cameroon, marked by a long interruption of its assistance to the transport sector. Portfolio reviews did identify the project implementation stumbling blocks, but the country was slow to respond to all these constraints: (i) delay in loan signature and effectiveness; (ii) delay in satisfying the conditions precedent to first disbursement; (iii) lack of effectiveness in project management and advancement; (iv) weakness of disbursements and financial management of projects; and (v) difficulties encountered in the procurement process.

3.1.1.4 Several of these measures suggested were followed by actions designed to accelerate the execution of active projects through the putting in place of a higher frequency of supervision so as to facilitate the putting into effect of the first disbursement. This did not prevent excessive delays in projects. The 2003 Portfolio Review even proposed: (i) the putting in place upon project approval, of a focal point in each government service involved, for the preparation of entry into force documents; (ii) preparation of project management procedure manuals; (iii) the accounting and financial audit of the projects by an independent firm recruited through competitive bidding; and (iv) computerization of project activities.

3.1.1.5 The opening by Bank of the national Program Office in March 2004 was aimed at supporting improved portfolio performance, by strengthening ties with the country's Authorities as well as coordination with other donors. The Bank's decision to open a Regional office domiciled in Cameroon in 2006 was intended to serve as a means of further improving the implementation of Bank operations, but also as a strong signal of the Bank to the Cameroonian Authorities, to apply themselves more in order to ensure that future operations are no longer bogged down by the same old problems and that the performance of Bank assistance is not adversely affected by the weak performance of the program, which depends heavily on the Borrower's performance.

3.1.1.6 At the level of the donor community, it is since 2003 that a Multi-donor Committee to which the Bank Group belongs was set up. This Committee is responsible for PSRP monitoring and meets regularly to deal with economic and financial issues, as well as cross-cutting issues (civil society, HIPC programs monitoring, PRSP statistics, etc). Its objective is to organize discussions around cross-cutting themes and to develop common positions. The difficulty which seems to arise is the existence of several frameworks for dialogue with the donors.

3.1.1.7 The TSP which was adopted in 1996, after 5 years of brainstorming by the donors and the Government and which was then addressing donors' concerns regarding sectoral dialogue and the Government's commitment was completed in 2003. Pending a new strategy, the EU and the Government then decided in 2004 that a "*Memorandum of Understanding on the reform and financing of the roads sub-sector in Cameroon*" be prepared in consultation with the MDC (to which the Bank belongs), in order to better understand the intentions, commitments and measures suggested by the Government to preserve the outcomes of this TSP, pending the preparation and approval of TSP II (envisaged during the year 2008).

3.1.2 Assistance to projects and to the program (studies and capacity development)

3.1.2.1 The Bank had already organized in Yaoundé, a workshop on procurement and disbursements in 1998 for project officers. By maintaining the PIU as the executing agency for the 2 road projects that it financed, the Bank's intention was to build on the experience gained by this PIU during previous road program which it had also financed. Within this framework, the Accounting Administrator of the PIU had come to the Bank in February 2001 for an induction course on Bank methods and procedures. In March 2001, the Government organized in Douala a seminar on project cycles, procurements and disbursement procedures of the Bank Group, for project Coordinators and managers and their accountants. This seminar was conducted by Bank officials and the Cameroonian Authority involved in the execution of the projects and was attended by the Unit Head and the Accounting Administrator of the PIU. During the launching of the Melong-Dschang Project in December 2003, the Bank organized in Yaoundé a seminar intended to recall the procedures as well as the steps to be followed to ensure its successful execution. It also organized in October 2003, a workshop bringing together eleven regional French-speaking countries to discuss corruption and which was attended by the Authorities, civil society, Members of Parliament, as well as the donors. In February 2005, MINEFI organized with Bank support, a workshop on the implementation of projects and centred on procurement and disbursement procedures.

3.1.2.2 Given that the Bank considers assistance ownership a significant dimension of its assistance, it had required the creation of a Unit specializing in projects which it finances, in a bid to facilitate knowledge transfer and improve project management. The seminars and frequent supervisions have actually enabled a real transfer of knowledge and know-how from Bank Experts to the PIU, as well as a considerable improvement in the management of infrastructure works (roads and bridges) by the MINTP. Through its vision of integrated road projects, the Bank aroused the interest of many Ministries concerned, insofar as the inclusion of related works of a social character in projects (markets, schools, women's homes, schools and health centres), required the participation of the stakeholders concerned.

3.1.2.3 The putting in place by the MINTP of this project implementation unit, financed by the Bank enabled its engineers to benefit from the experiments conducted elsewhere. For instance, certain modifications (use of crushed gravel instead of laterite, double-layered instead of single-layered course on verges, or bituminous concrete instead of double-layered course on roads), give hope for greater resistance of these roads to weights and to bad weather, unlike other roads which are degraded shortly after completion.

3.1.2.4 The financial dimension of the CNIC enclave project for its part required the setting-up of a Special Tenders board. Bank assistance also enabled CNIC to improve its managerial know-how as concerns major projects and large-scale maritime works. What is noteworthy is the fact that the Bank itself could even have benefited from this important project, had supervision not been so weak, as the special nature of this project would have enabled a real transfer of knowledge to the operational Experts of Bank. The second important point is that the financial instrument used by Bank (enclave project recommended by successive CSPs) was an innovation at the institutional level in Cameroon. The Bank's use of the ADB window (regardless of the reservations of the IMF) in this country which no longer had access to ADF resources, was a trigger which encouraged 4 donors (IsDB, ABEDA, BDEAC and Dutch Fund) to contribute to the success of this financial arrangement (knowing that the 3 CSP recommended that the Bank should co-finance projects). With this

project, CNIC thus gained experience on the procedures of the Bank and other Co-donors. Ownership by CNIC of managerial know-how concerning multiple contracts is unquestionable. *The performance of non-lending activities is thus very satisfactory.*

3.2 Performance and outcomes of lending operations

3.2.1 Effectiveness

3.2.1.1 The objectives of road projects (cf Matrices in annex), which were to facilitate the movement of people and produce and to reduce transport costs, are in the process of being achieved, despite delays incurred by projects financed between 1996 and 2004. These projects were carried out according to standards and are in the process of closing satisfactorily, despite all the delays noted (the interval between approval and entry into force were respectively 5 and 8 months, but the first disbursement could only take place nearly 36 months after their respective approval dates). Their output objectives stand all chances of being achieved. The program benefited from 7 supervision missions, whereas appraisal had envisaged only 3 to 4. It should however be noted that the supervisions increased (1 mission every 6 months), only after eligibility for cancellation of the two projects. However, the fact remains that the human resource and technical components of these supervision missions are reduced and limited to the Task Manager of the project, whereas the appraisal study had envisaged 3 Experts (1 Civil engineer, 1 Environmental Expert and 1 poverty Expert).

3.2.1.2 Certain exogenous factors however contributed to the delay of the projects. For instance, the Melong-Dschang works were suspended for 5 months (10 July to 15 November 2004) due to the rainy season. It should also be mentioned that savings on the cost of this project were realized following a modification of the alignment which encroaches on the cliff, thus reducing the quantity of retaining walls. The other contingency is the quantities of cut which decreased due to the nature of the mountain which proved to be sandy. These savings enabled the strengthening of the roadway structure and the sub-base went from 20 cm of laterite to 25 cm of crushed gravel, while the 20 cm crushed gravel base course was replaced by bituminized gravel. Similarly, the number, diameter and length of piles drilled at the supports of the 4 bridges were increased. These savings also enabled the use of asphaltic concrete on the surface course instead of the double-layered coating envisaged. As regards the objective of opening up farming areas, it stands all the chances being achieved; so is the improvement of the living conditions of the populations, thanks to the related works included in the projects (agricultural produce sales areas, drinking water, schools, health centres), without forgetting the shortening of distances and fuel savings in the case of Melong-Dschang (vehicles gain 80 km of road by not passing through Bafoussam) and the time saved (almost 2 hours, including traffic congestions in Bafoussam). In the case of the Ambam-Eking road, prior to the paved road, it took 48 hours of track to travel from Ambam to Eking and then reach Gabon by ferry (it was sometimes necessary to spend the night and wait for one's turn to cross, before the EU built the bridge) with which the region carries out intensive trade. Nevertheless, the 87 km of rural tracks envisaged in the Ambam project and the 53 km in the Melong project, have no chances of being carried out, due to insufficiency of counterpart funds, their cost having soared from CFAF 2 to 8 million /km, taking into account the shift in their implementation schedule.

3.2.1.3 As regards the enclave project whose financial engineering required the intervention of 4 other donors led by the Bank, the initial calendar envisaged the end of works in August 2005, but the delayed entry into force postponed this deadline to March 2008. Nevertheless, apart from the time overrun, the general objectives of the project matrix are proceeding in conformity with the updated schedule. The project design did not change significantly during its implementation, apart from a reconfiguration of the wharf, due to a geological contingency. There was an unexpected effect, following early receipts that CNIC was able collect even before project completion, given that since the breakwater was completed, divers have been appraising oil rigs on this protected site.

3.2.1.4 The weak coordination between the Bank and the other 4 donors which co-financed it affected the completion deadlines and pushed the costs upward. The Bank as leader did not set up an effective coordination for this complex project and set disbursement conditions which contributed to the delay. As regards supervision, the appraisal report had envisaged missions of 42 staff-days each (3 Experts for 2 weeks), but 18 months after the signature of the loan, there had been only 2 missions, one of 2 staff-days, carried out by the Department of operations and the other of 3 staff-days, carried out by the private sector Department, since the project was transferred to this Entity which suffers from inadequate study and supervision capacities. The 3rd mission took place 28 months later and lasted 3 staff-days (15-17 November 2006).

3.2.1.5 For the 2 projects, the Bank will have financed 46.5 km on the whole, which represents a 5 % increase in new paved roads in Cameroon, over the period, whereas the vehicle population doubled and the road length increased by 20 % (cf tables below). On the other hand, what is noteworthy is the transfer of passenger traffic from the railroad transport to surface transport, whereas as regards goods, the effect is the opposite. This also marks the role played by the privatization of railroad transport (1999), which donors encouraged (the Bank even took part in 1983 in the financing of the railway with the Douala-Yaoundé project). Concerning the impact of the 2 projects on traffic, this was not possible to quantify, given that road traffic statistics are *ad hoc* and unreliable.

ROADS IN CAMEROON

	1986	1991	1994	1997	2003	2005	2006 (*)
1. State of roads (1)							
- Paved roads (total) (km)	2928	-	-	4048	-	4800	4721
- Paved roads in good state (km)	38 %	-	-	-	-	25 %	41 %
2. Traffic trends (2)							
2.1. Road traffic growth (%)	-		+ 9 %			-	
2.2. Railroad traffic growth							
- Passenger traffic (million passengers)	-		1.752	-	1.277	-	
- Goods traffic (million tonnes)	-		1.206	-	1.830	-	

Sources: From: (1) MINT Statistics; (2) CSP 2005-2009; (*) Memorandum of Understanding / 2006

VEHICLE POPULATION IN CAMEROON (UNIT)

	1986	1995	1997	2002	2005
Number of vehicles					
- Private vehicles	89500	94757	102248	151835	175981
- Commercial vehicles	33500	39628	40964	56913	68335
TOTAL	123000	134385	143212	208748	244316

Source : From MINT Statistics

The significant delays incurred by these 3 projects caused a postponement of their effects, while for the two road projects, the stalemate over the farm-to-market roads altered the scale of the integrated projects desired by the Bank. *Effectiveness is unsatisfactory.*

3.2.2. Efficiency

3.2.2.1 In general, the estimated cost overruns of these projects are due to: (i) loan effectiveness delays; (ii) delays in satisfying disbursement conditions; (iii) delays in making available the counterpart funds; (iv) delays resulting from certain errors in the appraisal or technical economic studies; and finally (v) the weak performance of certain contractors, notably those which were to carry out the related works of the 2 road projects.

3.2.2.2 Owing to loan effectiveness delays, the projects faced the effects of heavy foreign exchange losses (the UA which was worth CFAF 917 in 2000 dropped to CFAF 750, between 2003 and 2006). The projects thus were thus substantially revaluated and this was passed on to the local counterpart funds. Thus, the Melong-Dschang project rose from CFAF 17.2 to 23.9 billion, leading to a 300 % increase in Cameroon's contribution. In addition to the delay incurred by the final acceptance of the Ambam-Eking project (18 months after the provisional acceptance), as a result of the technical reservations expressed by the Project Owner, the contractor that constructed this road is claiming interest on arrears to date, given that the contract stipulated disbursements after 28 days, whereas the Bank pays after 60 days. As a result of the delays incurred by related works, they faced the effects of the increase in price of the materials which were to be used for their construction. Moreover these increased costs led to the cancellation of the farm-to-market roads envisaged (140 km in all). The transfer to the Cameroonian State of the contingencies and the inaccuracies of estimates caused the Borrower a financial cost overrun, whereas it already had enormous difficulties mobilizing the counterpart funds. For the CNIC project, the cross conditions of the 5 donors delayed its entry into force. The first disbursement could be released only in 2005 (no disbursement could be released by the Bank, as long as all the other loans were not effective), thus entailing a rise in the commitment fees of the loan and compelling CNIC to pre-finance certain activities. The cost revaluation caused CNIC to request a financial supplement from the Bank.

3.2.2.3 As regards the economic benefits, it is agreed that the road projects generate savings on vehicle operating costs, leading to a drop in the maintenance expenses and fuel consumption, greater mobility (with travel and goods delivery time saved as earlier mentioned) and a reduction of pollution and road accidents. As for the social welfare benefits, these roads bring the populations closer to the services which they need (schools, health centres, government services, etc.).

3.2.2.4 At appraisal, the internal rate of return of the Ambam-Eking project was 15.5%, which was regarded as a rate justifying the investment. The sensitivity of this rate was analyzed with 3 assumptions (besides all things being equal): (i) a 10% increase in costs; (ii) a 10% reduction in the benefits; and (iii) a combination of the assumptions. This led to an IRR of 12 % and the project was considered economically viable. The rise in costs affected the part financed by counterpart funds (PIB and HIPC funds). The foreign exchange part financed by Bank represented approximately 90 % of the total project cost and was not revised upward. In the case of the Melong-Dschang project, at appraisal, the internal rate of return was 16.2% for the road and 14.4% for the bridge. These rates were considered satisfactory and able to justify the investment. The sensitivity considered 4 assumptions

(besides all things being equal): (i) a 10% increase in costs; (ii) a 10% reduction in the benefits; (iii) an absence of exogenous benefits; and (iv) a combination of the assumptions. Assumptions (i) and (ii) led to an IRR of 13.5 % for the road and 11.7% for the bridge, causing the project to be considered economically viable. The ERR for its part stood at between 12.6 % and 21 %, which, according to the appraisal report, was a good rate, compared to the opportunity cost of the capital in Cameroon (12 % at the time). Concerning the CNIC project, profitability was set at 17 % (for a Bank loan at the rate of 6 %), and its sensitivity took into account a 10 % fall in turnover and a 10 % rise in operational costs, with the beginning of positive cash-flow as of 2005, on the basis of steady receipts between 2010 and 2020 (CFAF 64.5 Billion /year). The rate was regarded as high in all these cases. The IRR was set at 17 % for the baseline scenario (14.38 % in case of a drop in turnover and 13.04 % in case of a 10 % rise in operating costs). This project will thus entail substantial financial expenses, following the shifting of the start of commercial activity (beginning of repayment as from 2007).

3.2.2.5 It should be mentioned that the sensitivity of these rates of return to project delays was not calculated. The delays incurred by these projects will inevitably affect their rates of return. However, it was not possible to recalculate them due to the lack of data. Conversely, increased supervision has now caused the disbursement of the 2 road projects to remain high (90 % and 95 %), compared to certain road projects financed by other donors and monitored by the DIER of the MINTP (whereas the projects of Bank are monitored by a specialized PIU). Thus, in 2007, for the Ayos-Bonis road (IsDB) or the Douala roads project (IDA), the 2 financing arrangements of which were signed 15 months after those of the Bank, the respective disbursements are 30 % and 38 % in 2007. Lastly, it should be mentioned that the ERR calculations did not take into account: (i) the impacts on women's incomes; (ii) the monetary value of the travel time saved and the VOC gains; (iii) improved road safety; (iv) improved farmer incomes; (v) increase in goods transit to neighbouring countries; and finally (vi) the creation of road maintenance SMEs and improvement of their turnover. *The efficiency of these operations is unsatisfactory.*

3.2.3 Institutional impact

3.2.3.1 Cameroon had taken into account as of its first TSP a number of institutional overhaul issues. However, following restructuring, the Ministry of public works (MINTP) and the Ministry of transport (MINT) which had hitherto been merged, became compartmentalized. Thus, at present, the Ministry of Transport is little involved in road projects, even if it is active in the domain of road safety, an activity which in other countries is handled by the Ministry in charge of civil Protection. The Bank for its part was unable to create synergy between Transport planning activities and Public works construction activities, for the simple reason that the Bank had relations only with MINTP, which was both Project Owner and Executing Agency of the 2 road projects falling within the framework of the TSP and the RDP controlled by this Ministry.

3.2.3.2 Furthermore, it was as a result of the heavy costs induced by the projects financed by donors (despite all the technical assistance provided by the WB and EU) and for purposes of greater effectiveness, that the MINTP had to be reorganized. This had to wait until 2005, but the new set-up did not really lead to the creation of a Road Agency required by the WB and supported by the MDC, to which the Bank belongs. The MINTP created a Department of road investments and maintenance (DIER), a Department of rural roads and a planning Division. The DIER comprises 7 sub-departments (against 11 formerly), of which the PIU

responsible exclusively for Bank-financed projects (for the other donors, monitoring is carried out by the DIER, given that unlike the Bank, no other donor requires the putting in place of a PIU for road projects). In addition, the institutional inconsistencies and poor coordination fostered racketeering at road checkpoints to the extent of wiping out the expected impacts of donor assistance. The Government is currently striving to combat this phenomenon. According to the *FORPRIX* survey conducted in 2002 by NIS, these illegal acts represent between 25% and 35 % of food produce transport cost per kilometre. For purposes of comparison of the orders of magnitude, the matrix of financed projects targeted a 20 % drop in transport costs.

3.2.3.3 It should be mentioned that during the period under review, as a result of the marked orientation towards the Agriculture sector and the Social sector, the number of operations and the length of roads financed by the Bank in the Transport sector were relatively weak, compared with those of donors such as the EU or the AFD. The Bank even had to stop the roads Programme project owing to the fact that the ADB window did no longer correspond to the status of Cameroon which was to be moved over to the ADF once placed under sanction by the donors. It nevertheless took back a component of the cancelled project (Melong-Dschang) by means of an ADF loan. The Transport sector experienced a vacuum during a full decade (1991 to 2001), so much so that the key donors (WB, EU, AFD) which had assisted this sector by means of other instruments (mainly grants) had already launched the process of reconfiguration of the institutional sectoral framework and were ahead of the Bank, which nevertheless continued to take part in overall assistance (notably encouraging Cameroon to prepare the TSP and reform the Transport sector).

3.2.3.4 Bank assistance also impacted the development of two executing Agencies (MINTP and CNIC), by broadening their experience through the implementation of integrated projects (infrastructure and related works of a social nature), that Bank was the first to initiate in Cameroon. Between 2001 (year of resumption of Bank operations in the sector) and end - 2004, even if the intrinsic institutional impacts of the 3 financed operations are difficult to quantify, the role of Bank reinforced the collective actions of the MDC, thus gradually correcting the institutional and organisational insufficiencies in Cameroon's Transport sector. The Bank even reinforced its presence locally by moving from the status of Office to the status of regional Representation of the Bank, with head office in Cameroon, which will inevitably reinforce this institutional assistance in the future. Lastly, an unexpected effect of these Bank-financed project that should be mentioned is to have enabled a link to be established between the road Industry and academic and scientific Research, insofar as the monitoring of the impacts of the Melong-Dschang project were entrusted to the University of Dschang and the analyses of materials were entrusted to the national control Laboratories. In spite of the inconsistencies which remain at the level of the Borrower and which the Bank is trying to iron out via the MDC, *the institutional impacts may be considered satisfactory.*

3.2.4 Sustainability

3.2.4.1 The sustainability of the outputs and the effects of the road projects are closely related to the regularity and quality of network maintenance. The Bank and other donors all note the insufficiency of road network maintenance; certain roads are over 25 years old, without having been strengthened after 15 years. The Road Fund thus came in time to control the budget resources allocated by the State. The resources of the RF are derived from: (i) the special tax on petroleum products (STPP) deducted directly from fuel depots (currently CFAF 40 per litre of super and CFAF 60 per litre of diesel); (ii) the road user charges (RUC); (iii)

the road toll (CFAF 500 per toll gate, for all vehicle types); (iv) the axle tax (that the RF collects at its weighing stations); (v) the transit tax for international transport; and lastly (vi) the weighing fine.

3.2.4.2 A 2nd generation Road Fund is under way and will henceforth have 2 windows, that of maintenance and that of investment. The Government has thus set up an appropriate financing structure, while the populations and civil society have in general, become aware of the strategic importance of the projects (notably the related works included in Bank projects) that these populations would like to protect from degradation. Furthermore, the road safety strategy has enabled more fluid traffic and safe passenger transport, despite the rise in accidents due to exogenous factors (recklessness, state of vehicles, etc). Since 2005, there are 8 weighing stations in operation, 2 are under construction and 13 are in the pipeline for the next 10 years. Although the Sub-Department of network maintenance (of the MINTP) takes part in the acceptance of works, in order to take them over subsequently, in a vision of long-term sustainability, the probability of sustainability of the two Bank-financed projects will nevertheless still depend on the supplementary budgets from the Government to supplement the resources of the RF. Their sustainability will also depend on the transparency of operations at weighing stations on large-size vehicles, some of which should be prohibited from importation, taking into account the load-maximum standards allowed in Cameroon (13 tons per axle).

3.2.4.3 Through this mechanism which is an arm of the Treasury and which was put in place in order to set up the RF, there have been increasingly substantial additional resources (even if still insufficient) to ensure the maintenance of road infrastructure. Since its inception in 1998, the RF has thus benefited from a budget which almost tripled between 1998 and 2005, following the raising of the STPP (from CFAF 20 to 40 / litre of super and CFAF 45 to 50 / litre of diesel) coupled with the high increase in the quantities sold. However, these amounts are still below actual maintenance needs. In 2003, the maintenance of the priority rural roads hardly received 3 % of the budget of the Fund, that is, the equivalent of the operating costs of this Fund. In 2005, this rate rose to 12 %, since *the Memorandum of Understanding* that donors, including the Bank, succeeded in making the Government accept, following initiatives by the EU.

ROAD MAINTENANCE RESOURCES (CFAF BILLION) AND SHARE REMITTED TO THE ROAD FUND (RF)

	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2003	2004 (a)	2005 (b)	2006
RUC (1)	19.9	18.8	21.5	22.5	23.9	32.3 (*)	-
Road Tolls (2)	2.9	4.1	4.5	4.7	5.2	5.1	-
Fines	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.4	-	-
Axle tax	0.8	1.2	0.4	0.9	1.3	-	-
Transit Tax (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Actually collected by the RF	20.3	19.6	23.4	23.9	25.1	35.0	48.6

Source: Memorandum of Understanding / May 2006

(1): RUC = Road use charges remitted to the RF

(2): CFAF 500 per passage at toll gate, for all types of vehicles

(3): Does not entail payment as road use tax

(*): Increase of TPP (from CFAF 20 to 40 / l of unleaded fuel and from CFAF 45 to 50 / l of diesel)

(a) : 71 % of the funds paid to the RF are devoted to the interurban network (3 % for rural roads).

(b) : 65% of the funds paid to the RF are devoted to the interurban network (12% for rural roads).

3.2.4.4 As regards the CNIC project, its quality at entry was already in itself a guarantee of satisfactory physical and financial sustainability. CNIC is renowned throughout the Gulf of Guinea for its service quality, as regards naval repair and its geographical position gives it an advantageous proximity differential. The Operating entities and the Prime contractor are of international renown. This provides a high level of guarantee and thus of physical sustainability, barring contingencies related to the risk of a major natural disaster, which would even affect the nearby refinery. Regarding financial sustainability, even in case of bankruptcy of the CNIC shipyard, the very nature of the work would enable its conversion into a commercial port. Nevertheless, in spite of the " Comfort letter ", the financing of this project is not covered by a governmental guarantee (cf appraisal report, paragraph 6.3.4 of the English version) and actually no guarantee was requested from the Cameroonian Government (cf appraisal report, paragraph 7.6.1 of the English version), which makes it delicate, given that it relies on the development of *offshore* oil exploitation in the Gulf of Guinea (itself dependent on world prices of oil) and on the competitiveness of its service tariffs vis-a-vis the competitors of Singapore, Spain, Portugal and South Africa. This project should thus be monitored closely and Bank should reinforce the human and technical resources of its supervision by the private sector Department. The IMF did not fail to point out the risk of compromising the "sustainability" of Cameroon's foreign debt, even if the Fund in the end did not object to this financing drawn on the ADB window, to which Cameroon no longer had access since 1995.

3.2.4.5 The budgets allocated to the RF for road maintenance increased sharply on the one hand (26 % of paved roads were in a good state in 2000 and 41 % in 2006) and taking into account the experience of CNIC in complex naval repairs, on the other hand, even with their delays, *the sustainability of these operations remains highly probable.*

3.3 Contribution to development

3.3.1 Development and gender equality

3.3.1.1 Despite the shifts in project start-up times, their development targets were attained on the overall during the decade under study, given that Bank assistance contributed to meet the challenges set by the country to increase its road density (total increase of 16 % of paved road length in Cameroon between 1996 and 2006) and to upgrade its infrastructures, by allocating resources progressively in order to ensure their sustainability (the resources of the RF were increased almost three-fold between 1996 and 2005). In conjunction with the other donors, Bank assistance generated substantial impacts on the organization of the sector (TSP II is under way, and the DIER of the MINTP was reorganized), on mobility (overall road traffic increased by 9 %), on trade (even if currently visible but still difficult to quantify). Certain expected outcomes concerning the living conditions of the populations are slowly being confirmed (better access to social services, reduction in travel time and transport costs and improved agricultural incomes).

3.3.1.2 The case of the Ambam-Eking road is interesting, insofar as, once the paved road section was completed, trade witnessed a boom, to the extent that the Eking market was no longer large enough to contain the surge of traders and buyers from Yaoundé, from Douala and especially from Gabon. Prior to this road, moving agricultural produce was costly and hazardous, owing to the state of the transportation routes, high transport costs, as well as the brigands who would attack travellers who had had a breakdown on the old chaotic track. Before these 2 new roads were financed by the Bank, this situation had adversely affected the

small farmers and household incomes in the areas concerned. These projects will henceforth contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of the poor populations thanks to: (i) the creation of steady jobs (transporters, road menders, tradesmen, etc.) (ii) easy movement and supply of products; and lastly (iii) accessibility to health, education and cultural activities, thanks to the related works included in these projects.

3.3.1.3 The inclusion by Bank of health centres and classrooms in these road projects will help attract school and paramedical staff to these remote areas. This assistance also helped improve village sanitation and contributed to the reduction of parasitic diseases, thanks to the systematic construction of septic tanks in these schools and health centres. These roads are already prompting the creation of community micro-enterprises for agricultural production, transport and small trades.

3.3.1.4 The women of the project area are engaged in most of the agricultural and informal sector activities. These roads enable them to become more active in farm work and processing their produce (fish processing such as smoking and drying, livestock, handicraft, etc). Often organized in women's Community interest groupings (CIG), they will no longer be exposed to the nuisances and hazards of road traffic, as was the case on the old tracks. The 2 projects have already eliminated most these problems and also helped the women to benefit from the reduction of the transport costs of their products to be sold on the markets. For instance, in the rainy season, before these roads came, the cost of transporting of a sack of groundnuts was CFAF 2000, whereas its market price was no more than CFAF 2500. Furthermore, these roads facilitate the evacuation of sick women to health or maternity centres in cases of emergency.

3.3.1.5 As regards the CNIC project, female staff members are already involved at the level of the Task-Force of the project. The women of the surrounding villages already benefit from the project works (food sellers), with the possibility of even creating road-houses subsequently after the completion of work. The training centre for CNIC staff, which will be built on the site, will also benefit the womenfolk. The related works under this project (small surgical clinic and women's cultural centre) already benefits the population and particularly women from the Limbe area. The only disadvantage at present is the postponement of the provision of farm-to-market roads, thus making the evacuation of farm produce from the forest zones to the paved roads difficult. However, at end- 2004, section 1 (asphalted roads) was completed, whereas certain annex works of the CNIC project (relocation of the village) were done, in addition to the recruitment of female officials of the Task-Force. The impacts on the area's activities, as well as the contribution of these projects to the improvement of the women's economic role were immediate.

3.3.1.6 In the long term, with the construction of the 2500 personnel residences, nearly 3000 women will find work as domestic assistants. The construction of the vocational training centre will have the envisaged effects on female skilled labour (besides the numerous general services recruitment opportunities). The only danger looming over this project (and that Authorities should anticipate) is the risk of this project attracting a massive influx people from other parts of Cameroon, which will translate into the sprawl of squatter settlements around the site. From this social development and gender equality perspective, despite the delays incurred by the 3 projects, *the performance of the assistance is satisfactory.*

3.3.2 Environment

3.3.2.1 It was in 1992 that the Government created a Ministry of the Environment and Forestry, charged with the development, coordination and monitoring of the environmental policy. Environmental protection is now perceived as a priority for sustainable development and a national environmental management plan was prepared in February 1996, with the assistance of the World Bank and UNDP. The objectives of this plan are to control population growth and distribution, adapt the legal framework and put in place an operational institutional framework.

3.3.2.2 In December 2004, this Ministry of the Environment and Forestry became the Ministry of the Environment and Protection of Nature. At the legislative level, Cameroon adopted a framework law on the management of the environment and several sectoral laws relating to the rational management of natural resources were promulgated. At the level of Bank, all the projects were categorized according to their environmental impact. The two road projects financed by Bank are both covered by environmental impact assessments (EIA), submitted to the BD of the Bank. Their direct impact areas were limited to the road sides and their immediate surroundings. These EIA had envisaged an environmental impact mitigation plan (EIMP) for each project, in order to ensure the monitoring of the environmental measures suggested in their EIA, during the implementation of the project. This was one of the conditions of the loans. It is to this end that an environmental expert was recruited by the respective PIU (the expert who was to monitor the EIMP of Ambam-Eking, however broke the contract and was not replaced by the PIU).

3.3.2.3 Even then, the execution of the 2 projects did not involve destruction of forests or archaeological works and even the aggregate quarries did not cause any ecological damage. For the CNIC project, a half-yearly environmental monitoring report is transmitted to Bank and to date no damage on the environment has been noted. Even the use of explosives was controlled by the bomb disposal experts of the Cameroon Army and the quarry does not generate dust, as there is no crushing of the rocks used for the construction of the breakwater. At the environmental level, **the performance is satisfactory.**

3.3.3 Community participation

3.3.3.1 The Bank systematized the participatory approach, both at the level of project preparation and appraisal as well as that of implementation. The 3 CSP of the period covered by this evaluation were themselves prepared using this approach which is perceived as the best means of reaching consensus on the key strategic guidelines of the Bank Group in Cameroon. The projects were thus formulated after consultation extended to the professional transport Organizations and road user Organizations. The Communities (in particular women's Groupings) as of the appraisal of the projects had taken part as stakeholders, to ensure the sustainability of the roads and especially of their related works, given that these attendant operations were going to enable them to create small agricultural produce processing co-operatives.

3.3.3.2 About ten villages benefited from consignments of machines, each constituting the equivalent of a small production workshop. The impact of these surfaced roads was also to be extended and strengthened by the provision of farm-to-market roads serving remote farms and the procurement of intermediate means of transport, to facilitate the transportation

of food products to sales areas. For the CNIC project which required the relocation of an entire village (including an ancestral cemetery), Community participation was even much stronger, both in terms of the socio-economic impacts of the project on the Community and of the improvement of the living conditions of the populations. The new village was thus connected to the drinking water supply networks and to the power grid, whereas this work was even not envisaged during the appraisal made by Bank and had to be paid for by CNIC from its own resources. Even if the participation of the populations and civil society was limited to the impacts of the projects and not to their configuration (given they are too technical and difficult for ordinary citizens to grasp), Community participation was very dense and ***Bank assistance is satisfactory.***

3.3.4 Private sector development

3.3.4.1 The level of integration of the two road projects is relatively significant insofar as, apart from the Prime Contractor, the bulk of the works were entrusted to local mixed or private enterprises. In addition to the building material suppliers, the project needs improved the businesses of many traders. Furthermore, these two roads create opportunities for the establishment of small road-house hotels, filling stations and garages. As regards maintenance, since network maintenance and studies and control services were privatized in 1994, there are at present nearly 10 large companies, of which 6 national and 4 international, as well as 70 SMEs. As regards engineering, Cameroon now has 30 Engineering firms, of which 5 in geotechnics and structures.

3.3.4.2 In the case of CNIC, besides a few subcontractors and a national consulting firm, which works on behalf of the Prime contractor, the level of participation of local enterprises remains low, insofar as the control of works and the implementation of the works of such a project are still inaccessible for them. In addition to the building material suppliers, the construction site needs are improving trade in the area. Private sector intervention will actually start only when construction of the workshops and the training Centre is launched. The project will also benefit the owner of the land from where the blocks of rock were collected to be used for construction of the breakwater, insofar as the owner can continue to work the quarry when the project ends. ***The effect of the assistance on private sector development is not very satisfactory.***

3.3.5 Regional integration

3.3.5.1 Regarding regional integration, the Ambam-Eking road was one of the major sections of the highway to open up the South and Centre provinces, and constituted the key vector of traffic between Cameroon and Gabon. The traffic had a huge untapped potential, due to the advanced state of degradation of the Ambam-Gabon Border section, which was one of the "transit routes" implemented by the Member States of CEMAC. It is a strategic route which contributes to the economic integration of 3 countries (Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea) and constitutes a vector of the development dynamic of their trade. As of the implementation of section I of the project (paved section) at end - 2004, the Ambam-Eking road witnessed increased trade with Gabon and even Equatorial Guinea. At appraisal, the Eking market had already been increased and had become a hub of trade in agricultural produce and sundry items. Whereas 350 parking spaces have been provided in this market, every Saturday nearly 2000 vehicles which come to the Eking market (witnessed during our visit), to the benefit of Cameroonian farmers and the Council, which charges CFAF500 per vehicle for parking.

3.3.5.2 As regards the CNIC project, besides the fact that it will free up the wharfs of Douala port and increase Cameroon's foreign trade volumes, its key raison d'être is the market for the repair of ships and oil platforms belonging to the oil producers of the Gulf of Guinea, which will be able in the near future to benefit from this major infrastructure. Eventhough these effects are taking long, given the dynamism of the Eking market and the *offshore oil rig* already appraised in Limbe by divers since construction of the break-water and even before the end of the project, *the impact on regional integration is satisfactory*.

4. PERFORMANCE OF STAKEHOLDERS

4.1 The Borrower and the Executing Agency

4.1.1 As of 1996, which marks the return to growth and the recovery of major macroeconomic balances, the Cameroonian Government had implemented the Transport Sectoral Program (TSP), in order to protect the road heritage, while strengthening its instruments and its human and legal means to ensure the sustainability of the new investments carried out with the assistance of donors. To this end, the Government strongly and continuously solicited support from its development partners, within the framework of this vast programme of improvement of the performances of its road investment plan and of the structural reforms which it initiated. This support concerns the protection and improvement of the road transport network, in order to help Cameroon: (i) open up the zones marked by poverty, but with high agricultural potential; and (ii) facilitate inter-State connections and promote regional integration.

4.1.2 The 2 road projects that the Bank financed towards end- 2000 fell within the framework of this TSP. It should however be recalled that the Melong-Dschang road project was already approved in 1991, with financing from the ADB window, but could not be put into force on schedule. The Bank thus approved it afresh for ADF financing. It was however necessary to increase the number of supervision missions (virtually every six months) to remove the obstacles and to avoid the cancellation of the two projects.

4.1.3 Within the framework of the implementation of the TSP, deficiencies appeared, given the workload concentrated on the MINTP alone, thus causing the MINT to be virtually left out of the process of Transport sector planning and regulation, since the Ministry for Transport and Public works had been separated into 2 distinct Ministries. The concentration of the development missions of the sector in terms of responsibilities almost exclusively on MINTP, had even led to the degradation of the priority network since 1999 (through lack of rehabilitation) and had relegated to the background the priority which should also be given rural roads, as well as the provision farm-to-market roads.

4.1.4 In addition the structure charged with the coordination of donor assistance was the Department of economic and technical assistance (DCET) which lacks the required means, given the volume of assistance. While the entry into force of the two loans were speedy, the conditions for first disbursement were only satisfied more than 30 months after the dates of commitment, whereas the MINTP had however acquired much experience in road projects with the Bank and other donors. Furthermore, whereas all road projects were supposed to fall squarely in line with the PSRP, the 2 road projects financed by Bank were cut down by the 174 km farm-to –market roads that that the Bank had included, taking into account their social dimension and their capacity to generate traffic on the two asphalted

sections which were to move the agricultural production from the forest belts to the markets of the area. The same applies to the CNIC project whose entry into force took almost 30 months as from the commitment of the loan, taking into account the administrative constraints and red tape in Cameroon's decision-making system.

4.1.5 In addition to the CSP 1996-1998 which recalled the Borrower's weak road project management capacity throughout the period 1996-2004, the Portfolio Reviews wallet recurrently identified the generic problems which the projects encountered and which are still due to delays in effectiveness, delays first disbursement and weak disbursement rate. For its part, the poor financial management of the projects is due to: (i) insufficiently training t of certain PIU officers in management; (ii) errors in the processing of the operations due to the lack of computer equipment which would have facilitated the production of indicators, of project status and absorption of the budgets; and lastly (iii) the tendency to **fragment** certain projects into a multitude of small contracts owing to the limited number of large construction or consulting firms in Cameroon.

4.1.6 The monitoring and management of the road heritage involved several stakeholders, even though the coherence of the decisions taken was not guaranteed. This entailed the fragmentation of budgets shared among various Ministries. It is in a bid to rectify this prejudicial situation that the Government in 2005 created the National Roads Board, as a body to coordinate policies, programs and operations. This Board is placed under the authority of the Prime Minister and assists the Government in the development, implementation, evaluation and control of the implementation of the national roads Policy. The Cameroonian President himself recognized in 2005, in a Message to the Nation that: " In spite of the prescriptions of their road maps, government services are often contented with ordinary routine management which are bogged down by wrangling or conflicts of jurisdiction". This evaluation confirms that this situation even adversely affected the performance of the Bank. *The Borrower's performance is unsatisfactory.*

4.2 Bank

4.2.1 As regards financial engineering, the Bank in the roads sub-sector rather opted for the complementarity of the projects. It did not engage in co-financing as recommended by the successive CSP. It is only for the CNIC project that Bank accepted the proposal to take part in co-financing, as an enclave project. However, owing to insufficient allocation of human resources for supervision, the Bank was unable to take advantage of its role as leader in any other way than through majority financial contribution, given that the title of lead donor which it had taken, with the agreement of the other donors, proved not very effective and even delayed the 1st disbursement, by introducing a condition that was too constraining for the Executing Agency.

4.2.2 Nevertheless, its assistance does meet the economic and social objectives as well as Cameroon's sectoral needs. The initial outcomes show that these objectives are being achieved. For instance, since the construction of the Ambam-Eking road, vehicles take less than 1 hour from Ambam to Gabon as against nearly 10 hours when they had to the chaotic and muddy track in the rainy season, and then wait for their turn to cross the river in a dugout. The bridge which is financed by the EU contributes to the reduction of the prices charged by transporters, as well as the risks of rotting of the produce supplied on the market. These products are sold on the large trans-border market at prices which are affordable to the poorest, while the producers sell greater amounts of their produce, thus improving their incomes substantially.

4.2.3 Taking into account different studies which preceded the evaluations of the 3 projects, as well as the contribution of other donors to the institutional reorganization of the sector (even if the results obtained remain insufficient), the instruments used were adapted and enabled the Bank to increase its commitments (via the ADB window and in spite of the risks which this instrument entails in such an economic and financial context, thus making closer supervision of this project in the future compulsory), otherwise than through the ADF whose amounts are limited compared to this country's needs.

4.2.4 The Bank Group learnt many from lessons of its experience in Cameroon, marked by a lengthy interruption of its assistance to this country's transport sector. Over the period covered by this evaluation, the Bank thus made the decision to organize 3 workshops on procurements and disbursements in Yaoundé (cf 3.1.2). It also sought to strengthen the experience gained by the PIU of the MINTP by organizing an introductory course to Bank procedures for the Administrator of this PIU at the headquarters of the Bank in Tunis. It finally organized a regional workshop on corruption (December 2003). In addition to seminars, the frequent supervisions of the road projects enabled a real transfer of knowledge. By compelling the MINTP to create a PIU reserved exclusively for projects of the Bank, these Bank interventions had palpable impacts on enhancing project monitoring capacities, without however being able to act on the external administrative environment, which remains the real bottleneck in the implementation schedule.

4.2.5 The enclave project was put in place thanks to the lead role played by the Bank and to its ripple effect on the 4 other donors whose financial contributions were made on the basis of its appraisal. Nevertheless, each donor maintained its conditions and managed its financing at his own pace. These then generated cross conditionalities, leading to the shift of the first disbursement of the Bank to 2005, as it was unable to make any disbursement, as long as all the other 4 loans were not effective. To a certain extent the Bank was therefore a victim of the incompatible paces of loan processing and effectiveness conditions of each of the 5 donors, given the diversity of co-donors: an Islamic Bank which practises leasing (IsDB), an Arab Bank and a sub-regional development Banks (ABEDA and BDEAC), and a bilateral financial donor (Dutch Fund).

4.2.6 The Bank had initially installed a program officer (based in the UNDP building in Yaoundé), who took part in the Donors conference, then it opened the National Program Office of the Bank in 2004, which enabled the Bank to show its determination to strengthen its support and to improve its assistance to Cameroon. The opening of this Office was designed to be not only a means of further improving the implementation of Bank operations, but was also a strong signal from Bank to the Cameroonian Authorities, for them to strive further to avoid future operations facing the same old problems. Seeking to go further, the Bank decided in 2006 to domicile its Regional office in Yaoundé, in a bid to further improve the performance of its assistance, by practising outreach assistance like other donors. The Bank has also intensified the supervision of its road projects in recent years, making it possible to avoid cancellation. Given this dynamic evolution of its assistance, even if it is strongly thwarted by the insufficiencies of the Borrower's performance (which had negative effects on the program and delayed these projects which then incurred cost overruns), *the overall performance of Bank remains satisfactory.*

4.3 Other Donors

4.3.1 Between 1996 and 2004, the other donors who contributed substantially to the development of the roads sub-sector were: (i) the IDA program, which included an emergency Programme of trunk roads maintenance, in a bid to slow down the degradation of the roads and concerned 956 km of road (350 km of paved roads and rehabilitation of 780 km rural roads); (ii) the AFD program which concerned technical assistance, training and sundry maintenance on major and rural roads; (iii) that of the EU which concerned road maintenance, training, support to reforms and development of the rural roads strategy; (iv) that of the IsDB, concerning the rehabilitation of 1112 km of rural roads and the asphaltting of a regional road, and (v) that of GTZ (launched since 1998) which targeted the privatization of the maintenance of paved roads and the transformation of agencies into private companies, leading to the creation of the Road Fund.

4.3.2 The donors had been involved as of 2002-2003 in the preparation and the finalization of the PRSP and they met within the framework of a PRSP Technical monitoring Committee, while holding bi-monthly sectoral meetings. The African Development Bank was sometimes represented by its operational Departments at these meetings, in addition to the representative of its national program Office. The meetings concerning road infrastructure are two-monthly. The consultation framework (Multi Donor Committee) had been created in 2003, after noting the insufficiency of inter-ministerial coordination, which constitutes the most fragile link in the national ownership of the assistance and dialogue with partners.

4.3.3 The UN Agencies intervene on several cross-cutting assistance aspects, such as industrial governance; promotion of investments and technology; productivity; development of micro-enterprises; environment; poverty; etc. UNIDO is supporting the formulation of the Integrated Program of sustainable industrial development over the period 2002-2005. In addition, this Organization was also committed to supporting the Cameroon Government in the development and implementation of a Ten-year jobs creation Plan as an integral part of the national poverty reduction Strategy. UNDP recently launched a Project Support Services Centre in Yaoundé which places Experts at the disposal of PIUs to assist them during project implementation. The World Bank is financing a project aimed at improving the road infrastructure of Douala city and another aimed at rehabilitating and modernizing railroad transport.

4.3.4 The EU imposes its conditions for rural roads and requires the Road Fund to have a higher maintenance budget (from CFAF 22 billion in 2004, rose to 40 in 2006). The EDF had even been suspended, one of the reasons being the minimum amount that the Government was to allocate to road maintenance. Whereas hitherto, the RF had allocated 1% to rural roads, this rate has now been changed to 12%, under pressure from the EU and there is henceforth a Department of rural roads at the MINTP. At the level of the Representation of the EU in Cameroon, there are 4 Experts in infrastructure, who are in charge of the preselection of projects, checking their conformity to the EDF criteria and monitoring them.

4.3.5 During the present evaluation, through meetings with the EU and the AFD, as well as field visits, it was noted that the Ambam-Eking road is a perfect example of donor coordination. Although cofinancing was not chosen, the complementarity of their projects enabled the implementation of the Nsimalen-Mbalmayo / Ebolowa-Ambam / Ambam-Eking / Ambam-KyeOssi roads and two bridges. Among these coordinated project sequences, the Bank financed the section which links Ambam to the Gabonese border, where an EU-financed

bridge crosses the Ntem River and links up with Gabonese territory. The Bank thus provided its assistance to a roads sub-sector already strongly supported and supervised by the WB, EU and AFD. The role of Bank within the MDC, whose Transport Committee meets every two months, cannot be overlooked, insofar as all the actions initiated by this MDC in this sector (such as *the Memorandum of Understanding* which was hammered out following a 2004 decision between the Government and the European Union) are submitted to the Authorities as emanating from all of the donors of the MDC.

4.3.6 As regards co-financing, the CNIC project was put in place thanks to the lead role played by Bank and to its ripple effect on the other donors (ABEDA, IsDB and Dutch Fund), whose financial contributions were based the Bank's evaluation. Coordination between the 5 donors was difficult and even the Bank as leader, could not manage to bring them together around the same table, just as no joint supervision mission could take place. This lead donor role could not therefore be maintained during the implementation phase, the main reason being the inadequate technical capacities for project supervision of the private sector Department of the ADB.

5. CONCLUSION, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

5.1.1 Although the Bank's assistance cannot be comparable to that of donors such as the EU and AFD, it provided strong support to Cameroon's transport sector, thanks notably to the financial weight of the CNIC project (UA M. 30 of a total of UA M 54 for the 3 projects, on account of the moderate dimensions of the 2 roads financed). However, the choice of the two road transport sub-sector projects in the 3CSPs seems to fit into a short-term vision as it is based on the programs of other donors. The Melong- Dschang project was even a take-over by the ADF, of a road section already financed by the ADB in 1991, under the Roads Program project, which encountered problems as of 1995 and was stopped in 2000.

5.1.2 This situation thus gives the impression that its successive sectoral strategies are ad hoc strategies, aligned with the strategies of the EU and the AFD, whereas its portfolio is deeply marked by its previous choices as a result of which the transport sector in 1996 represented 45 % (cumulated over 24 years of assistance to Cameroon). This cumulative portfolio of the Bank remains still largely dominated by transport, even if it has dropped to below 38 %, following the choices of the CSP of the period 1996-2004, which led to the strengthening of assistance in the social and agriculture sectors. Just as for its assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa therefore, there was in Cameroon as well, a point of inflection of its assistance as regards infrastructure, which in the future is likely to have effects on the development of certain productive sectors (such as industry and energy), which are known to respond rapidly to employment and growth constraints.

5.1.3 Even if the concerted CSPs do not give the projects financed during the decade 1996-2004 a particular characteristic, Bank assistance has enabled a major innovation, even if it is not without risks. Indeed, the implementation of infrastructure projects with a social dimension appears to be a promising approach which provides food for thought, as it is capable of helping the Bank to centre its strategies on infrastructure that will come with social facilities (known as related works) that are suitably located provided only that the PIU aspect is revisited.

5.1.4 The 3 projects evaluated showed that despite the delays (which could have been reduced to the minimum through softer conditions and closer monitoring), it is quite possible to design and build a road or a shipyard complex, along with schools, health centres, cultural centres and small agricultural projects or even water and electrification projects. This vision can indeed enable the Bank to strengthen its image as a donor focusing on integrated and broad-social impact infrastructure, which can be the best means of attaining the MDGs, with minimum waste of effort and financial resources, and thus with maximum performance of overall assistance.

5.1.5 As regards private sector development repeatedly raised in CSPs, it should be mentioned that as concerns incentives to the emergence of a formal and strong private sector, Cameroon's legal and fiscal provisions are still too unclear for the Bank to be so engaged in operations targeting this sector, as to have projects in the pipeline. However, to pursue the strategies adopted thus far, the Bank should not lose sight of the possibility of making the CNIC enclave project (which it financed as majority and lead donor) a true springboard for industrial and technological development which can foster private sector development.

5.1.6 Indeed, with the establishment of this project on the same site as an oil refinery, one could envisage the creation of an industrial and technological centre (Limbe Technopolis), which is shipbuilding and oil industry-oriented and capable of generating a fabric of SMEs specializing in subcontracting in the domain of ship maintenance, packaging of petroleum products (or even recycling of lubricants), boiler making, a school of deep water diver technicians, etc. Such a strategy would constitute an indirect means of strengthening the competitiveness and sustainability of the CNIC project which it financed.

5.1.7 The Bank has thus reached a turning point where it must choose between reducing support to infrastructure, to the benefit of social projects, with the risk of sterilizing the sectors that foster growth, and conceiving infrastructures that foster economic productivity and that comprise social dimension components, of which the moderate success which it scored with 2 minor road projects and an enclave project. This would need to be analyzed further, considering that this approach can give Bank a major advantage over the other donors, even if the scope of the impact of 2 road projects are difficult to quantify and is overshadowed by the big road projects financed by the other donors besides the fact that small projects have high banking management costs and gradually generate a downward trend in Bank staff efficiency.

5.2 Lessons

- (i) The Bank showed proof of inadequate appraisal of the role of related works and of their comparative advantage. As such, it did not seek to ensure their effective implementation, leaving sole responsibility for them to the Borrower, which had difficulties mobilizing the resources from the PIB and HIPC, whereas these integrated works were eagerly awaited by the populations. Given that the CSP does not underscore this advantage, this innovation is not perceived as a strategic choice and an irreversible option.

- (ii) Transport has structuring effects, but the Bank was unable to make proper use of the TAF instrument and take advantage of the works of the other donors, and envisage potential projects with the private sector, whereas the successive CSPs repeatedly proposed the identification of enclave projects and operations with the private sector. The Bank-financed operations have demonstrated that it is possible to provide infrastructure at the same time as schools, health centres, cultural centres and minor viable agricultural projects. This innovative vision could thus enable the Bank to be perceived as a preferential donor, when it comes to infrastructure with a strong social impact enabling the attainment of the MDGs, with optimized investment and better performance of its assistance.
- (iii) Cameroon is targeting a high overall road density, yet 3/4 of its road traffic is concentrated in only 3 regions (out of 10) which hardly account for 1/3 of the national paved network. The Borrower is thus likely to err in making and weighting its investment options, thus ending up with works which are likely to be under-used. Such a strategy would not only affect Borrower performance, but would adversely affect the Bank's performance.

5.3 Recommendations

- (i) The Bank should shun minor projects and focus its strategy on financing integrated and integrative infrastructure projects, which already give it a comparative advantage over the other donors. Furthermore, in order not to jeopardize the value added to the projects which it finances, obtained through this advantage, the Bank should include the costs of related works in the parts which it finances and should attach as much importance to them as to the main work, in order to spare them the risks of unavailability of the required local counterpart funds.
- (ii) The Bank should use the TAF to study determine the appropriateness of creating a Technopolis in Limbe, which would be shipbuilding and oil industry-oriented and could generate a fabric of SME specializing in subcontracting, or serve as an enterprise nursery (UNIDO already having financed a study on this theme) in Cameroon. Such a strategy would also constitute an indirect means of mitigating the CNIC project risk and enhancing the competitiveness and sustainability of this major enclave project.
- (iii) The Bank should undertake studies which would enable it to prioritize the country's projects, and select only operations with the strongest inter-sector complementarities. The CSP should thus be highly selective in terms of targeting sectors, but also projects, while taking into account their integrative capacity, their complementarity and their capacity to impact growth and the matrix of economic activities. The country should give priority to the 3 regions where road traffic is concentrated.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF BANK ASSISTANCE

OVERALL PERFORMANCE (Rounded up, unweighted average of 4 scores)	3.1	SATISFACTORY
--	------------	---------------------

1) RELEVANCE AND QUALITY AT ENTRY:

	Score	REMARK
1.1. RELEVANCE	4	Very relevant assistance
1.2. QUALITY AT ENTRY	4	Very satisfactory quality
1.3. AVERAGE	4	Very satisfactory performance

2) PERFORMANCE OF OPERATIONS :

	Score	REMARK
2.1. NON-LENDING OPERATIONS : (Identification and preparation of projects ; Priorities of the country ; Priority of the CSP ; Dialogue ; Adaptation of instruments ; Institutional contribution ; Portfolio review)	4	Very satisfactory performance
2.2. LENDING OPERATIONS	2.87	Unsatisfactory performance
2.2.1. Ambam - Eking Project	(2.8)	Unsatisfactory performance
2.2.2. Melong – Dschang Project	(2.8)	Unsatisfactory performance
2.2.3. CNIC Project	(3)	Satisfactory performance
2. AVERAGE (2.1 + 2.2) / 2	3.4	Satisfactory performance

3) BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE:

	Score	REMARK
3. BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE (Implementation ; Coordination ; Mastery of procedures)	2	Unsatisfactory Performance

4) PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK :

CRITERIA	Score	REMARK
4. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK (Identification ; Studies ; Evaluation ; Instruments ; Coordination with donors ; Frequency of supervision)	3	Satisfactory performance

Rating: 1 (Very unsatisfactory); 2 (Unsatisfactory); 3 (Satisfactory); 4 (Very satisfactory).

PROJECT PERFORMANCE : AMBAM-EKING ROAD

CRITERION	Score	ARGUMENTS
1. Relevance, Quality at entry (Consistency with strategy of the country ; Consistency with / Bank Strategy ; Quality at entry)	4	The project belongs to the strategic network identified as priority in the TSP. This road contributes to the development of sub-regional relations. Technical economic and environmental studies were undertaken by the AFD before appraisal by the Bank. The feasibility studies and detail design with CBD were undertaken by qualified Firms.
2. Effectiveness (Sectoral, physical and financial objectives)	2	The entry into force took 8 months as from approval. The objective of opening up the farming areas was achieved, as well as that of improving the living conditions of the populations. 80 km reduction of travel distance. Savings on fuel and time (before the road, it took 48 hours to travel between the 2 cities). But the project took longer than envisaged, following problems encountered by the Contractor. The farm-to-market roads were not carried out.
3. Efficiency (IRR and ERR ; Trend of costs)	2	Revaluations for foreign exchange losses borne by the local counterpart funds. These increased costs led to the cancellation of the farm-to-market roads. The contingencies and the inaccurate estimates made by the Bank led to a financial supplement. The absence of a PCR makes it impossible to assess the trend of rates of return.
4. Institutional impact (Coordination of assistance ; Sectoral planning and coordination capacity; Level of ownership)	3	The assistance led to a moderate improvement in the MINTP's capacities to manage works and enabled synergy between 6 Ministries. The Ministry of Transport was not very involved. However, the PIU benefited from a transfer of knowledge in the mastery of procedures and integrated and multiple-contract project management. Seminars and supervisions enabled a transfer of knowledge and know-how from the Bank
5. Sustainability (Technical, economic and financial sustainability)	3	Certain technical changes in construction give hope for greater weather and weight resistance. The sustainability will also depend on the proper operation of the heavy vehicle weighing stations.
6. Cross-cutting impacts (Poverty ; Gender ; Environment ; Regional integration; Private sector ; Community participation)	3	Construction work entrusted to mixed or local private enterprises. Project works site needs improved business for traders. Women will benefit from the related works (care centres, women's centres and schools). Women folk took part in certain works (of the 9 enterprises, 2 are headed by women). Possibility of increasing women's incomes thanks to sales along the way. The project was the subject of an environmental study. It strengthens sub-regional trade exchanges, as the Eking market has become a commercial crossroads between Cameroon and Gabon.
AVERAGE	2.8	

Rating: 1 (Very unsatisfactory); 2 (Unsatisfactory); 3 (Satisfactory); 4 (Very satisfactory).

PROJECT PERFORMANCE: MELONG-DSCHANG ROAD

CRITERION	Score	ARGUMENTS
1. Relevance, Quality at entry (Consistency with strategy of the country ; Consistency with / Bank Strategy ; Quality at entry)	4	In the TSP, this strategic project was a priority and its related works fell within the framework of the country's school and health maps. It is in line with the Bank's sectoral policy. Feasibility studies and detail design with CBD were undertaken and served as a basis for the preparation and appraisal of the project by the Bank.
2. Effectiveness (Sectoral, physical and financial objectives)	2	The entry into force took approximately 8 months. The objective of opening up the farming areas was achieved, as well as that of improving the living conditions of the populations (wells, schools, health centres, reduction of travel distance by 80 km and savings on fuel). However, the project took much longer than envisaged. Furthermore, the farm-to-market roads envisaged were not carried out.
3. Efficiency (IRR and ERR ; Trend of costs)	2	Considerable revaluations following foreign exchange losses borne by the local counterpart funds (from CFAF 17.2 to 23.9 billion, with a three-fold increase of the local counterpart). These increased costs led to the cancellation of the farm-to-market roads envisaged at appraisal. The project is still ongoing, hence the IRR and ERR trends cannot be assessed.
4. Institutional impact (Coordination of assistance ; Sectoral planning and coordination capacity; Level of ownership)	3	The assistance led to an improvement in the MINTP's capacities to manage works and enabled synergy between 6 Ministries. However, the Ministry of Transport was only slightly involved. The PIU gained considerable experience (mastery of procedures and management of integrated and multiple-contract projects. Seminars and supervisions enabled a transfer of knowledge and know-how from the Bank
5. Sustainability (Technical, economic and financial sustainability)	3	Certain technical modifications in construction give hope for greater weather and weight resistance. The sustainability will also depend on the proper operation of the heavy vehicle weighing stations.
6. Cross-cutting impacts (Poverty ; Gender ; Environment ; Regional integration; Private sector ; Community participation)	3	The level of integration of the project is significant, given that apart from the prime contractor, the construction work was entrusted to mixed or local private enterprises. Besides the suppliers of building materials, many traders' businesses also improved due to project work site needs. Women will benefit greatly from the related works with a high impact on social welfare and on women). During the works and after completion, women will have the possibility of increasing their incomes thanks to petty roadside trade in sundry products.
AVERAGE	2.8	

Rating: 1 (Very unsatisfactory); 2 (Unsatisfactory); 3 (Satisfactory); 4 (Very satisfactory).

PROJECT PERFORMANCE : CNIC NAVAL REPAIR BASE

CRITERION	Score	ARGUMENTS
1. Relevance, Quality at entry (Consistency with strategy of the country ; Consistency with / Bank Strategy ; Quality at entry)	4	The project is justified by the maritime reform, the saturation of the port of Douala and the limited capacity of Cameroon's exportation by sea. Need for a deep water port to accommodate oil rigs and large tankers. It contributes to the sub-regional co-operation (Gulf of Guinea). It falls within the framework of Bank policy which encourages maritime infrastructure which improve the export earnings and strengthens regional trade. Feasibility study carried out 1 year prior to loan approval. CNIC carried out 1 market research and 1 Master Plan. Environmental impact assessments and bathymetric studies conducted. In all, the Bank used 25 studies for the preparation and appraisal of the project. Quality at entry is of an exceptional level.
2. Effectiveness (Sectoral, physical and financial objectives)	2	The entry into force took 28 months and remains very high compared to the Bank standard. Start-up was 18 months late and the first disbursement took place 2 years later. The schedule envisaged the end of work for 31 August 2005, but was revised to 2008. The objectives of the matrix are unfolding in accordance with the forecasts. The project configuration has not changed.
3. Efficiency (IRR and ERR ; Trend of costs)	2	The crossed conditionalities, the absence of coordination between signatures and entry into force delayed the first disbursement up to 2005. The project was revalued following the foreign exchange losses, the rise in the prices of the fuels and materials used. The counterpart funds were revised upward. The turnover of CNIC already increased since the breakwater was completed oil rigs have already been appraised on this protected site.
4. Institutional impact (Coordination of assistance ; Sectoral planning and coordination capacity; Level of ownership)	3	The dimension of the project required the creation of a special tenders Board. With this project, Bank assistance improved the CNIC's capacities of management of major maritime works. The Project implementation Unit benefited from a considerable experience acquired, both from the viewpoint of mastery of procedures of the Bank and other donors, and from the viewpoint of consultations with world-renowned enterprises. The Bank's.???. (enclave project) is unprecedented at the institutional level.
5. Sustainability (Technical, economic and financial sustainability)	3	Quality at the entry of this project was already a guarantee of sustainability of the project. The Contactors and Prime Contractor are world-renowned, hence a high level of physical sustainability is expected. World demand for offshore oil drilling and oil transportation by sea also give hopes of financial sustainability.
6. Cross-cutting impacts (Poverty ; Gender ; Environment ; Regional integration; Private sector ; Community participation)	4	Contractorship and construction works are still inaccessible to Cameroonian enterprises which will be able to intervene with the construction of the workshops and training School. The project improved the businesses of hotels in the area. The women folk are benefiting from this project at the level of the PIU (4 women, including 2 officers). The related works (private surgical clinic and women's centre) are already benefiting the women as well. There were 5 environmental assessments and a half-yearly monitoring report is transmitted to Bank. The oil producers of the Gulf of Guinea will benefit from this deep and clear water infrastructure (for underwater inspection).
AVERAGE	3	

Rating: 1 (Very unsatisfactory); 2 (Unsatisfactory); 3 (Satisfactory); 4 (Very satisfactory).

RECOMMENDATIONS AND MONITORING MATRIX

Lessons	Recommendations	Monitoring
<p>The Bank showed proof of inadequate appraisal of the role of related works and of their comparative. As such, it did not seek to ensure their effective implementation, leaving sole responsibility for them to the Borrower, which had difficulties mobilizing the resources from the PIB and HIPC, whereas these integrated works were eagerly awaited by the populations. Given that the CSP does not underscore this advantage, this innovation is not perceived as a strategic choice and an irreversible option.</p>	<p>(i) The Bank should shun minor projects and focus its strategy on the financing of integrated and integrative infrastructure projects, which already give it a comparative advantage over other donors. Furthermore, in order not to jeopardize the value added obtained through this advantage to the projects which it finances, the Bank should include their costs in the part which it finances and should attach as much importance to them as to the main work, in order to spare them the risks of unavailability of the local counterpart funds.</p>	<p><i>OPSM OINF</i></p>
<p>Transport has structuring effects, but the Bank did not make proper use of the TAF instrument and take advantage of the works of the other donors, to prepare a pipeline of potential projects, with the private sector, whereas the successive CSPs recurrently proposed the identification of enclave projects and operations with the private sector. The Bank-financed operations have demonstrated that it is possible to provide infrastructure at the same time as schools, health centres, cultural centres and minor viable agricultural projects. This innovative vision could thus enable the Bank to be perceived as a preferential donor, when it comes to infrastructure with a strong social impact enabling the attainment of the MDGs, with optimized investment, better performance of its assistance.</p>	<p>The Bank should use the TAF to study determine the opportuneness of creating an industrial and technological Technopolis in Limbe, which would be shipbuilding and oil industry-oriented and could generate a fabric of SME specializing in subcontracting, or serve as an enterprise nursery (UNIDO already having financed a study on this theme) in Cameroon. Such a strategy would also constitute an indirect means of mitigating the CNIC project risk and enhancing the competitiveness and sustainability of this major enclave project.</p>	<p><i>OPSM OINF</i></p>
<p>Cameroon is targeting a high overall road density, yet 3/4 of its road traffic is concentrated in only 3 regions (out of 10) which hardly account for 1/3 of the national paved network. The Borrower is thus likely to err in making and weighting its investment options, thus ending up with works which are likely to be under-used. Such a strategy would not only affect Borrower performance, but would adversely affect the Bank's performance.</p>	<p>The Bank should undertake studies which would enable it to prioritize the country's projects, and select only operations with the strongest inter-sector complementarities. The CSP should thus be highly selective in terms of targeting sectors, but also projects, while taking into account their integrative capacity, their complementarity and their capacity to impact growth and the matrix of economic activities. The country should give priority to the 3 regions where road traffic is concentrated.</p>	<p><i>OPSM OINF Country</i></p>

1. TREND OF GDP at market value (2000/2004) in CFAF billions

	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002	2003	2004 Est.
GDP at market value	6388	7049	7374	7583	7976	8350
Primary sector	1362	1391	1539	1551	1653	1753
Secondary sector	1824	1944	2076	2045	2096	2239
Tertiary sector	2159	2534	2602	2776	2963	3044

Source: Cameroonian Authorities; In RBCSP 2005-2009

2. COMPARISON OF PAVED ROAD NETWORKS

	Paved roads (km)	km / 1000 km ²	km /1000 inhab.
Côte d'Ivoire	6514	16	0.384
Ghana	6000	25	0.354
Cameroon	4048	09	0.280

Source: AFD (Study on transports chain and competitiveness)

3. TREND OF NATIONAL VEHICLE POPULATION

Years	Private Veh.	Mini-trucks	Trucks	BUSES	ST & T	TR et EM	TOTAL
1995	94 757 (70.5 %)	16 239	10 629	7 158	2 554	3 048	134 385
2005	175 981 (72.0 %)	26 120	16 249	15 983	4 421	5 562	244 316

Source: Ministry of Transport

4. AVERAGE DAILY TRAFFIC ON PAVED ROADS (vehicles/day)

	km	Cars	Pick-up	Bus	Trucks(Mini)	Trailers	TOTAL
CAMEROON	4046	56200	15634	30667	10367	5632	118500
CENTRE	684	13932	5226	8161	3178	1238	31735
LITTORAL	498	14478	3123	8833	3493	2529	32456
WEST	332	13564	2820	6478	1531	240	24633
Sub-Total	1514	41974	11169	23472	8202	4007	88824
3 Regions/Cameroon	37.4 %	74.7 %	71.4 %	76.5 %	79.1 %	71.1 %	75 %

Source: Ministry of Transport

5. CAMEROON AMONG ECCAS COUNTRIES : PAVED NETWORK AND MAJOR ROAD NETWORK:

COUNTRY	Surface area in km ²	Major road network	Paved network	% de revêtement RRB/RRP	Densité routière km/100km ²
Angola	1 247 000	22 000	8 000	36	1.8
Burundi	27 800	7 520	1 365	18	27
Cameroon	475 500	21 156	4 725	22	4
CAR	623 000	9 307	692	7	3
Chad	1 284 000	6 200	537	9	0.5
Congo	342 000	5 047	1 000	20	1.5
DR Congo	2 344 885	58 305	2 801	4.8	2.5
Equatorial Guinea	28 050	2 880	291	10	10.3
Gabon	267 670	9 170	937	10	2.9
Rwanda	26 300	5 409	1 023	19	20.6
SaoTomé	960	320	68	21	33.3
Total	6 666 900	147 314	21 439	15	2.2

Source: ECCAS: Final evaluation report of UNTACDA II and various other sources)

MATRICES OF PROJECTS AND OUTCOMES


MATRIX AND OUTCOMES of the Project : PROVINCIAL ROADS PROJECT	
OBJECTIVES:	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
<p>Sector Goal: Sustainably improve the service level of the priority network, thus contributing to the opening up of the country internally and externally.</p>	<p>About 20 % drop in transport costs on the project roads and 22.5 km increase in the length of paved roads as from 2004.</p>
<p>Project Objective: open up the major farming areas with high agricultural potentialities by providing a permanent road link between Melong and Dschang and Eseka-Lolodorf. Furthermore, it will contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of the local populations by carrying out the related works.</p>	<p>Reduction in VOC of about 35 to 45% on the project roads and better access to socio-economic infrastructure in 2004, for approximately 10 000 people ; in addition, at least 10% reduction in water-borne diseases in 2004 at Ntingué 1 and 2, Santchou and Lelen – About 5% increase in primary school enrolment, – approximately 50% reduction in classroom congestion in the three roadside schools – about 30% reduction in post-harvest losses.</p>
<p>Outputs : A new double-laned asphalted road between Melong and Dschang Bridges reconstructed in the plain between Melong and Lolodorf Related works carried out</p>	<p>15 km of road on the cliff, 7.5 km of the plain of the Melong-Dschang highway paved and the surface course renewed over the 22.5 km of the plain in 2004 4 bridges reconstructed on the road in the plain and one bridge reconstructed in Lolodorf in 2004 53 km of farm-to-market roads provided, 6 produce sales areas constructed at Ntingué 1 and 2, 4 drinking water points provided at Ntingué 1 and 2, Santchou and Lelen, 10 classrooms reehabilitated, 8 classrooms constructed and provided with furniture and latrines for primary schools at Ntingué, Litieu and the entry to Dschang in 2004, a health centre constructed and equipped at Ntingué 2 and a safety centre constructed at the foot of the cliff in 2004.</p>
<p>RESULTS OBTAINED: At end- 2004, the physical execution misses of this project had hardly reached 30%. Still pending was the implementation of the envisaged conditional phases with financing from the PIB or HIPC (rehabilitation of schools, construction of a dispensary, water points and market sheds, as well as work on 7.5 km of road and the construction of a bridge at Lolodorf). The funds intended for this work were disbursed only on 6 May 2005. Despite all the difficulties encountered by this project and the probable cancellation of the 53 km farm-to-market roads which were not provided owing to insufficient counterpart funds, at the date of this evaluation, the objectives are in the process of being achieved (at end- 2007 or in 2008 at the latest).</p>	
<p>REMARKS : The Melong-Dschang road project was already envisaged within the framework of the roads program (PR) approved in 1991 and had been financed by the ADB window. This RP had had a delay in its execution and could not enter into force on schedule. From 1994, Cameroon was eligible only to concessional resources of the Bank. The RP projects not yet implemented were then directed to the ADF, for financing where possible. Taking into account the importance of the Melong-Dschang road for the evacuation of the agricultural produce of the zone and its capacity to contribute to the reduction of the poverty of the populations of the area, Cameroon had requested the Bank and had obtained an approval of a loan to finance this project with concessional funds. This project was again approved on 29 March 2001 and was prepared in November 2001. It was entered into force on 10 December 2001 that is, 8 months after approval, which period is close to Bank standards (6 months). The long delay which followed then made it eligible to pure and simple cancellation. The conditions precedent to first disbursement were satisfied only in September 2003 and the 1st disbursement could be released only on 8 February 2004 that is, 25 months following loan effectiveness .</p> <p>The project was started in July 2001 and the works for section 1 were envisaged for 29 months (of a total project duration of 42 months). Unlike the Ambam-Eking project, where the Consultant in charge of monitoring the environment had given up work, for this project, the study was entrusted this time around to the University of Dschang which already had experience in the assessment of impacts on development and poverty reduction.</p>	

MATRIX and OUTCOMES of the: OIL RIG REPAIR FACILITIES (CNIC) Project	
OBJECTIVES :	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
Sector Goal: To increase the share of the industrial sector in the GDP of Cameroon	Creation of new industrial activities in 2005 in the Limbe area
Project Objective: The specific objective of the project is to enable CNIC to capture a large part of the oil rig repair market in the Gulf of Guinea	As from 2002: wet docking of 2 rigs and 80 ships in Douala dock per year. (Continuity of current production). As from 2005: dry docking of a semi-submersible rig and a self-lifting rig per year. Site repair of 4 production rigs as from 2005.
Outputs Wharf constructed ; Dredging done and wharf area constructed ; Breakwater constructed. Offices, buildings, training centre and industrial hangars constructed Floating dock procured, 2 mobile cranes, workshop and shipyard equipment, and various machines procured. CNIC employees trained	A 390 m long wharf constructed in 2005 590,000 m3 of materials dredged and 11 ha of wharf area completed in 2005 A 700 m long breakwater constructed in 2005. 3500 m ² of offices and 12000 m ² of workshop constructed in 2005. Procurement, not later than 2005, of a 30,000 tonne floating dock Procurement in 2005 of two 300 t.m cranes with a maximum jib of 100 m, machine tools, teaching aids, and sundry vehicles and machines. All the staff concerned trained in 2005
<p>RESULTS OBTAINED: This project thus goes beyond the time frame of this evaluation (end- 2004). However, it was noted that the project works had made significant progress. The breakwater is almost completed, the related works are completed (health centre equipped with a mini-clinic, women's arts centre, relocation village of the displaced populations), and the commencement of construction of the wharfs and workshops is imminent. Despite a considerable shift in the schedule and cost overrun, the project however stands all chances of being completed in mid-2008, under the best technical conditions, taking into account the high level of proficiency of the Project Owner, the construction companies and the technical consultant placed at the disposal of the Task-Force by the Bank, as well as rigorous set-up put in place by the project Owner.</p> <p>REMARKS: During the Portfolio Review of November 2006, a supervision mission noted that the project cost was to be revised upward (by about 30 %), thus compelling CNIC to envisage a request to the ADB for supplementary financing. This rise is due to: (i) depreciation of the dollar against the Euro and the CFA franc; (ii) rise in unit prices, shift in the implementation schedule; (iii) increase in the cost of petroleum products; and (iv) scope of the geological hazards which have affected the cost of dredging and foundation works. While the initial schedule envisaged the completion of works at 31 August 2005, the first disbursement could be released only on 13 May 2005.</p>	

MATRIX and OUTCOMES of the: AMBAM-EKING ROAD Projet	
OBJECTIVES :	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
<p>Sector Goal: 1. Contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of the populations in the South and Centre provinces and contribute to regional integration.</p>	<p>Increase in regional trade of around 10%, and in addition, approximately 10% increase in socio –educational facilities as from 2003.</p>
<p>Project objectives: Improve the service level of the socio-economic infrastructure in the project area, by putting in place a permanent link between Ambam and Eking and providing facilities and undertaking actions for the benefit of the local populations. Enhance the institutional capacities of the MINTP and the MINEF</p>	<p>Reduction in VOC of about 35 to 45% from 2003 on the Ambam-Eking road and better access to socio-economic infrastructure for approximately 11 000 people; in addition, reduction of at least 10%, of diseases of fecal origin in Akoulouzouk, Minyin, Mekomo Ambam, Nlono and Abang Minko' o, by the construction of latrines, reduction of rainy season school absenteeism rate by about 30% and of classroom congestion by approximately 50%, in roadside schools, raising the primary school enrolment rate in these villages by about 5%, improved agricultural yields of about 2000 women in 2003 Increase and efficiency as from 2003 of the interventions of the MINTP and MINEF</p>
<p>Outputs : A new double-laned asphalted road between Ambam and Eking Socio-educational infrastructure rehabilitated, increased and equipped Health infrastructure provided and equipped Socio-cultural infrastructure in Abang Minko' o built and equipped Farm produce sales areas provided Farm-to-market roads provided Sensitization campaigns on STD/AIDS, environmental protection and health education conducted Small agricultural processing equipment acquired Training of HD and MINEF staff and environmental monitoring carried out Small office and transport equipment acquired</p>	<p>27 km of paved road and 5 stop zones provided in 2003 3 classrooms rehabilitated and equipped in a village, 11 classrooms built and equipped in 4 villages and 8 homes for school teachers built in 4 schools in 2003 The Abang Minko'o health centre repaired and equipped, a house built for the head of the centre, 15 latrines built in five villages and 4 ponds provided in Minyin and Abang Minko' o in 2003 A women's empowerment centre, including a youth hall provided in Abang Minko' o and equipped in 2003 10 food product sales areas provided and the Abang Minko' o market rehabilitated in 2003 87 km of farm-to-market roads provided in 2003 Training of 52 youths to conduct the sensitization campaigns (2 per village) carried out and 4680 youths sensitized as from 2003 239 small equipment (37 for farm produce processing for women, 200 for transportation of the farm produce and 2 motor-pumps for the CIG) procured in 2003 10 staff trained in environmental audit, and 70 officers of the MINTP sensitized to the environmental impacts of road projects and 20 forest rangers of Ambam and Abang Minko' o trained in 2003 Small office equipment and 10 motor bikes procured in 2003</p>
<p>RESULTS OBTAINED: The objectives achieved at end- 2004 were limited to section I (paved road) and to the purchase of computer and transport equipment. Estimated initially at UA M. 9.93 (of which UA M.7.79 in foreign currency, for an ADF loan of UAM. 8.9), this project will finally cost UAM.12.56, that is, an increase in 41% on the cost initially envisaged. The final disbursement date was maintained by Bank at 30 September 2006, although payments for certain services already provided are not yet paid by Bank. During this evaluation (at end-March 2007), the road was completed, with a length of 25.3 km, instead of the 27 km estimated at appraisal. However, work on the 87 km of farm-to-market</p>	

roads, designed to open up the farming areas was not yet done. The cost of this work had been under estimated (CFAF 6 to 8 million /km, against CFAF 2 million /km estimated) and it became difficult to mobilize such an amount of local financing. In spite of its delay recorded at 31 December 2004, the project today has all chances of being carried out, but without the farm roads which however play a significant social and economic role. Furthermore, the environmental monitoring study was not carried out, following default by the local Consultant who had been selected. On the date of this evaluation, the other implementation targets are virtually achieved and certain classrooms are already operational, even if completion work continues. Some of the related works were revised upwards: (i) the number of rehabilitated classrooms rose from 3 to 6; (ii) the number of newly built classrooms went from 11 to 18, in order to provide each school with a complete cycle of 6 classes; and (iii) a health centre was rebuilt and made larger following its destruction, as it was located on the road alignment. **REMARKS:** The Bank prepared this project in October 1999 and carried out its appraisal in July 2000. Approved 5 months later, the loan became effective after 7 months (9 August 2001), thus meeting the Bank standard (6 months). Work was expected to start in June 2001 and for a duration which was then estimated at 29 months. But, 2 years after, the disbursement rate was still 0% and the project had become eligible to cancellation. The conditions precedent to first disbursement could be satisfied only at end- 2003 and the first disbursement was released on 28 January 2004 that is, 29 months following loan effectiveness and 2 months after launching section 1 works (paved road). This section 1 was completed in 14 months and its provisional acceptance was pronounced on 10 February 2005. However, the construction company lodged a complaint for the late start of section 2 which could not be implemented on schedule, owing to the late mobilization of the counterpart funds. Following this dispute, the Project Owner decided to invite bids in January 2006 for the related works in 9 lots and which started more than one year after the end of section 1.


MAP OF THE ROAD NETWORK OF THE PROJECT : Melong-Dschang Road



Project

PS: This map and the two that follow are exclusively designed to indicate the geographical locations of the projects reviewed. The names used and the boundaries shown on these maps do not imply on the part of the ADB Bank Group and the Consultant who used the illustrations, any opinion concerning the legal status of the territories, nor any approval or acceptance of the boundaries whatsoever.

AMBAM-EKING ROAD PROJECT



CNIC PROJECT SITE MAP




TRANSPORT PROJECTS BETWEEN 1972 AND 2004 IN CAMEROON

PROJECT	Approval	Effectiveness	Disbursement 1	Amount	End
DOUALA AIRPORT TERMINAL	11/22/1972	-	-	3 000 000.00	06/30/1976
DOUALA AIRPORT TERMINAL	06/24/1975	05/09/1976	-	1 110 000.00	06/30/1976
DOUALA PORT (PHASE I)	12/21/1976	04/22/1977	04/25/1977	5 000 000.00	03/31/1982
DOUALA PORT (PHASE II)	08/18/1977	11/01/1977	06/29/1978	5 000 000.00	03/31/1982
STUDY BAMENDA EKOK ROAD	09/25/1979	09/30/1982	10/06/1982	950 000.00	06/30/1994
DOUALA-YAOUNDE ROAD	10/28/1980	12/13/1982	01/25/1983	10 000 000.00	12/31/1982
NEW RAILWAY STATION DOUALA	06/08/1982	03/08/1984	03/29/1984	11 330 000.00	06/30/1994
DOUALA-YAOUNDE RAILWAY	02/22/1983	06/07/1984	10/15/1984	22 800 000.00	12/31/1989
STUDY YAOUNDE- KRIBI ROAD	03/12/1985	03/26/1987	06/28/1994	1 639 473.00	12/31/1994
MBALMAYO-EBOWA ROAD PROJECT	09/22/1986	09/23/1988	10/20/1988	47 150 000.00	06/30/1994
BAFOUSSAM-FOUMBAN ROAD PROJECT	01/18/1989	08/06/1990	10/15/1992	18 220 000.00	04/30/1992
ROADS PROGRAMME	06/17/1991	02/11/1993	07/01/1994	95 000 000.00	12/31/2002
ROAD SECTOR REHABILITATION	06/17/1991	02/11/1993	04/03/1997	506 579.00	12/31/2002
Commitments approved during the period 1996-2004					
AMBAM-EKING ROAD PROJECT	12/14/2000	05/09/2001	01/14/2004	8 900 000.00	12/31/2006
PROVINCIAL ROADS PROJECT	03/29/2001	12/10/2001	01/15/2004	15 000 000.00	12/31/2009
CNIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJ.	12/12/2002	04/29/2005	04/29/2005	30 020 300.07	12/31/2007

Source : SAP / 05/04/2007

SCHEDULE OF TRANSPORT SECTOR OPERATIONS

Evaluation of Cameroon's transport sector in 1996-2004



BIBLIOGRAPHY (LIST OF DOCUMENTS USED) ***1. Documents published by the Bank :**

- Documents de Stratégie Pays (DSP) : 1996 – 1998 ; 1999 – 2001 ; 2002 – 2004 ; 2005 – 2009
- Rapports de revue de portefeuille (RRP) : octobre 2000 ; mars 2004 ; février 2007
- Quelques Rapports de supervision des 3 projets.

2. Documents from Cameroonian government services :

- @ Stratégie du Secteur du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics / MINTP/ Cellule Opérationnelle – Stratégie ; 15/04/2007
- @ UNION EUROPEENNE - Ministère des Travaux Publics / PLAN DIRECTEUR ROUTIER du Cameroun / DOCUMENT DE SYNTHESE / Février 2006
- @ INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ; DEUXIEME ENQUETE CAMERONAISE AUPRES DES MENAGES ; Profil de pauvreté en milieu rural au Cameroun / Décembre 2002
- @ CAMEROON - PROJECT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF OIL RIG REPAIR FACILITIES IN LIMBE - NAVAL AND INDUSTRIAL SHIPYARD OF CAMEROON - ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) Nov 2001
- @ CAMEROON : CHANTIER NAVAL ET INDUSTRIEL DU CAMEROON / PROJET DE CONSTRUCTION D'INFRASTRUCTURE DE REPARATION DES NAVIRES ET PLATEFORMES / PETROLIERES A LIMBE ETUDE D'IMPACT ENVIRONNEMENTAL ET SOCIAL / VERSION FINALE ; SEPTEMBRE 2001
- @ CAMEROON : CHANTIER NAVAL ET INDUSTRIEL DU CAMEROON PROJET DE CONSTRUCTION D'INFRASTRUCTURE DE REPARATION DES NAVIRES ET PLATEFORMES PETROLIERES A LIMBE / ETUDE D'IMPACT ENVIRONNEMENTAL ET SOCIAL / PLAN DE GESTION ENVIRONNEMENTALE ET SOCIALE ; JANVIER 2002
- @ CAMEROON : PROPOSAL FOR AN ADB LOAN OF US\$ 45.40 MILLION TO FINANCE THE PROJECT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF OIL RIG REPAIR FACILITIES IN LIMBE CAMEROON SHIPYARD AND INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING LTD ; June 2002
- @ Rapport d'achèvement PROJET D'AMENAGEMENT DE LA ROUTE AMBAM – EKING Cellule de Suivi de l'Exécution des Projets Routiers ADB ; Mars 2007

3. Documents from various sources :

- @ Cameroon: Country Assistance Evaluation January 24, 2001; Operations Evaluation Department; Document of the World Bank
- @ CAMEROON : UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK (Plan-Cadre des Nations Unies pour l'Aide au Développement) 2002/03 – 2006/07
- EQUIPE DES NATIONS UNIES AU CAMEROON ; Yaoundé; Janvier 2002
- @ NOUVEAU PARTENARIAT POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE L'AFRIQUE MECANISME AFRICAIN D'EVALUATION DES PAIRS ; Préparé avec l'appui du Bureau d'Etudes Service d'Experts pour le Développement ; EVALUATION DE LA GOUVERNANCE AU CAMEROON ; (Phase Préliminaire) Rapport Définitif
- @ RAPPORT SUR LES INDICATEURS DE PERFORMANCE DU SECTEUR DES TRANSPORTS AU CAMEROON ; NGOUMBE Zacharie Consultant Indépendant Yaoundé-Coordination SSATP - Cameroon ; Avril 2004 ; Programme de Politiques des Transports en Afrique Subsaharienne (SSATP) ; Bank Mondiale
- @ Cameroon Country Profile MDG ; Bank Mondiale
- @ CAMEROON : Le risque d'une stratégie de développement inadaptée aux besoins de l'économie nationale ? AFD ; DEPARTEMENT DES POLITIQUES ET ETUDES DIVISION DE LA MACROECONOMIE ET DES ETUDES ; Février 2003
- @ Stratégie de Coopération 9e FED ; Cadre de stratégie de la coopération Cameroon - Communauté européenne 9e FED ; Yaoundé, le 16 Juillet 2001 ;
- @ Bank Mondiale : IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-28690) ON A LOAN/CREDIT/GRANT TO THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR PROJECT; June 24, 2004

* All these documents are available in soft copies in the CD-Rom handed over to the Task-Manager by the Consultant .

LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED IN CAMEROON *:**MINEFI :**

Mr. BOULLEYS B. Robert, Sous-directeur « Afrique » DCET / MINEFI.
 Mr. MEADBA Secrétaire Permanent CTS (Comité Technique de Suivi des Programmes).
 Mr. ATANGA Zacharie ; Mr. LAH Kouotou Valentin ; Mr. MENGATA Christophe ;
 Mr. NJOUMA J-Pierre ; Mr. NDOH Ndzie Joseph Chargé d'études ; Mr. LOGMO MAAH Jean Jules
CAA : Mr. NDONOU René Chargé d'études Assistant ; Mr. FONGANG Augustin Assistant

ROAD FUND:

Mr. NENGUE Samuel Donatien Administrateur du Fonds Routier.

MINTP :

Mr. ZONOU Dieudonné, Directeur des Investissements et de l'Entretien routier (DIER) du MINTP,
 Mr. NINGUE Justin, Chef de la Cellule d'exécution de projets (CEP) projets routiers ADB
 Mr. MBELLA EDOUMBOU Jean Michel, Ingénieur, chargé du projet AMBAM-EKING
 Mr AZONFACK Jean Claude, Ingénieur Chef du projet Aménagement routiers
 Mr. TIENCHEU DEUMAGA Janvier Roger Administrateur comptable de la CEP.
 Mr. M'KHININI Habib Chef de mission représentant de STUDI, Maître d'œuvre du projet

MINT :

Mr. AOUDOU Dotel Moussa Directeur des transports terrestres
 Madame ENO Sous-directrice des transports routier et ferroviaire

CNIC :

Mr. PONDY Jean Directeur de la Task-Force du projet CNIC
 Mr. DEMBRI Ali Assistant technique de la Task-Force
 Mr. MEROUCHI Miloud Chef de projet représentant le Maître d'œuvre du projet
 Mr. DONAT A. KINGUE Assistant du Directeur de la Task-Force

SNEC :

Madame WAMAL Siliki Inspectrice ; ex. CEP de l'étude « Eau Assainissement 16 centres »
 Mr. Jean KENDECK Directeur des Etudes et des travaux
 Mr. ATANGANA KOUNA Basile Administrateur de la SNEC

AES-SONEL :

Mr. EKOBO Théophile Directeur de la Régulation et du contrôle de gestion

MINEE :

Mr. GHONNANG Z. Jean-Pierre Directeur de l'électricité
 Mr. BALLA Richard, Sous-directeur du contrôle des activités du transport et de la distribution
 Mr. NGUESSEU André Sous-directeur de la, planification et de la production de l'électricité

MINPLAPDAT :

Mr. FEZELI Jules Représentant du MINPLAPDAT

UNDP :

Madame DEDE EKOUE Représentant Résident Adjoint du PNUD Cameroon
 Mr. NEBIE Gustave Economiste Senior ; Mr. NDING NTAH Marcellin Assistant Pauvreté
 Mr. Martin ZEH-NLO Chargé du portefeuille *Energie-Environnement-Eau-Assainissement* PNUD

UNIDO :

Madame BENNANI BAITI Fatma-Zohra Représentante régionale ONUDI basée au Cameroon

WB

Madame Astrid MANROTH Assistante financière Bank Mondiale
 Mr. ADZIGBEY Yao Gbevope Expert ; Mr. BENMAAMAR Mustapha Expert

AFD :

Mr. AUDIBERT Christian, Ingénieur des routes AFD

EU:





Mr. TZARTZAS Ioannis Chef de section Infrastructures

* **This list includes only the names of persons with whom the Consultant held work sessions.**

Cameroon

COMPARATIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

	Year	Cameroon	Africa	Developing Countries	Developed Countries
Basic Indicators					
Area ('000 Km ²)		475	30 307	80 976	54 658
Total Population (millions)	2007	18.5	963.7	5 448.2	1 223.0
Urban Population (% of Total)	2007	49.5	39.8	43.5	74.2
Population Density (per Km ²)	2007	39.0	31.8	65.7	23.0
GNI per Capita (US \$)	2006	1 080	1 071	2 000	36 487
Labor Force Participation - Total (%)	2005	42.6	42.3	45.6	54.6
Labor Force Participation - Female (%)	2005	38.6	41.1	39.7	44.9
Gender -Related Development Index Value	2004	0.497	0.475	0.694	0.911
Human Develop. Index (Rank among 174 countries)	2004	144	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Popul. Living Below \$ 1 a Day (% of Population)	2001	40.2	45.0	32.0	20.0
Demographic Indicators					
Population Growth Rate - Total (%)	2007	2.0	2.3	1.4	0.3
Population Growth Rate - Urban (%)	2007	3.0	3.5	2.6	0.5
Population < 15 years (%)	2007	41.1	41.0	30.2	16.7
Population >= 65 years (%)	2007	3.6	3.5	5.6	16.4
Dependency Ratio (%)	2007	80.7	80.1	56.0	47.7
Sex Ratio (per 100 female)	2007	99.9	99.3	103.2	94.3
Female Population 15-49 years (% of total populat)	2007	24.0	24.2	24.5	31.4
Life Expectancy at Birth - Total (years)	2007	50.4	54.2	65.4	76.5
Life Expectancy at Birth - Female (years)	2007	50.8	55.3	67.2	80.2
Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000)	2007	34.5	36.1	22.4	11.1
Crude Death Rate (per 1,000)	2007	14.4	13.2	8.3	10.4
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000)	2007	87.5	85.3	57.3	7.4
Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000)	2007	144.5	130.2	80.8	8.9
Total Fertility Rate (per woman)	2007	4.3	4.7	2.8	1.6
Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000)	2004	669.0	622.9	440	13
Women Using Contraception (%)	2004	26.1	26.6	59.0	74.0
Health & Nutrition Indicators					
Physicians (per 100,000 people)*	2005	18.4	38.2	78.0	287.0
Nurses (per 100,000 people)	2005	43.9	110.7	98.0	782.0
Births attended by Trained Health Personnel (%)	2004	61.8	43.7	56.0	99.0
Access to Safe Water (% of Population)	2004	66.0	62.3	78.0	100.0
Access to Health Services (% of Population)*	2000	80.0	61.7	80.0	100.0
Access to Sanitation (% of Population)	2004	51.0	44.2	52.0	100.0
Percent. of Adults (aged 15-49) Living with HIV/AIDS	2005	4.9	4.5	1.3	0.3
Incidence of Tuberculosis (per 100,000)	2004	179.0	310.2	144.0	11.0
Child Immunization Against Tuberculosis (%)	2005	77.0	78.1	82.0	93.0
Child Immunization Against Measles (%)	2005	68.0	68.0	73.0	90.0
Underweight Children (% of children under 5 year)	2004	18.0	39.0	31.0	...
Daily Calorie Supply per Capita	2004	2 212	2 434	2 675	3 285
Public Expenditure on Health (as % of GDP)	2002	1.2	5.6	1.8	6.3
Education Indicators					
Gross Enrolment Ratio (%)					
Primary School - Total	2004/05	117.0	96.7	91.0	102.3
Primary School - Female	2004/05	107.0	90.4	105.0	102.0
Secondary School - Total	2004/05	44.0	43.1	88.0	99.5
Secondary School - Female	2004/05	36.0	36.5	45.8	100.8
Primary School Female Teaching Staff (% of Total)	2003/04	39.7	47.5	51.0	82.0
Adult Illiteracy Rate - Total (%)	2006	32.1	43.3	26.6	1.2
Adult Illiteracy Rate - Male (%)	2006	23.0	34.5	19.0	0.8
Adult Illiteracy Rate - Female (%)	2006	40.2	52.4	34.2	1.6
Percentage of GDP Spent on Education	2003	3.8	4.7	3.9	5.9
Environmental Indicators					
Land Use (Arable Land as % of Total Land Area)	2005	12.8	6.0	9.9	11.6
Annual Rate of Deforestation (%)	2000-05	0.9	0.7	0.4	-0.2
Annual Rate of Reforestation (%)	2000-05	14.0	10.9
Per Capita CO2 Emissions (metric tons)	2005	0.4	1.0	1.9	12.3



Sources : ADB Statistics Department Databases; World Bank: World Development Indicators;

last update : March 2008

UNAIDS; UNSD; WHO; UNICEF, WRI, UNDP: Country Reports

Note : n.a. : Not Applicable ; ... : Data Not Available; * : latest data available within 1995-2000